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DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMAND FOR THE 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS 
JOSEPH MARGULIES* 
Cognitive psychologists have long understood the tendency of people 
to make sense of what is new by analogy to what is old.  They call this 
“analogical reasoning.”1  I prefer the more familiar and less clunky 
phrase, “reasoning by analogy,” but the meaning is the same.  Reasoning 
by analogy “allows us to apply knowledge we have from one domain to a 
new context and therefore to make inferences and judgments without 
starting from scratch.”2  In addition, by framing our understanding of the 
novel in terms of the familiar, we conjure up images of a proper solution to 
new problems.  “When our understanding of the source domain includes 
normative prescriptions and evaluations, [they] are applied analogically to 
suggest the right evaluation or course of action in the new situation.”3  This 
 
* Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.  In the interest of 
disclosing possible biases, I was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004), involving post-9/11 detentions of foreign nationals at Guantanamo, and 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), involving post-9/11 detentions of U.S. citizens in Iraq.  
Presently, I am counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose interrogation the infamous 
“torture memos” were written.  These were legal memos written by attorneys with the Office 
of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice which wrongly concluded that torture, when 
ordered by the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief, would not violate domestic 
or international law.  Zubaydah is often described as a candidate for preventive detention.  
An earlier version of this Article was presented at a symposium at Seton Hall University 
Law School.  I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments and to Sidney 
Tarrow, Albert Alschuler, Jonathan Simon, and Michael Sherry for their many suggestions.  
Thanks also to Sarah Grady and Zachary Dillon for their research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. G. WINTER, DANGEROUS FRAMES: HOW IDEAS ABOUT RACE & 
GENDER SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION 4 (2008).  Analogical reasoning is much discussed as a 
mode of judicial decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical 
Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical 
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
2 See WINTER, supra note 1, at 4. 
3 Id. at 4–5. 
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Article applies these insights to the present debate over preventive 
detention of alleged terrorists. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The post-9/11 world has produced a call for the preventive detention of 
suspected terrorists, by which I mean a system of indefinite detention based 
solely on predictions of future dangerousness without regard to past 
conduct.4  Legal academics and journalists have spilled considerable ink 
exploring this topic, but almost no attempt has been made to place the call 
in its larger cultural context.5  This is regrettable since it amounts to reading 
only the last chapter of a long book then grumbling that events seem to 
have come upon us with so little explanation.6 
 
4 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, BROOKINGS INST., LONG-TERM TERRORIST DETENTION AND 
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY COURT (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209_detention_goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf; 
Stephanie Cooper Blum, The Why and How of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 
26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 51 (2009); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, 
Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009); Stella Burch Elias, Rethinking 
“Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective: Three Frameworks for Detaining 
Terrorist Suspects, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2009); Lindsey Graham & John 
McCain, How to Handle the Guantanamo Detainees, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124157680630090517.html; Glenn Greenwald, 
Victory on Preventive Detention Law: In Context, SALON (Sept. 24, 2009), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/09/24/detention; Joanne 
Mariner, Criminal Justice Techniques Are Adequate to the Problem of Terrorism, BOSTON 
REV. (Dec. 10, 2008), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.1/mariner.php.  For a discussion of 
preventive detention pre-9/11, see Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive 
State, 88 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998) (noting the increased call for a preventive 
state pre-9/11 and exploring its constitutional limits). 
5 Most legal academics have been slow to examine post-9/11 policies in light of modern 
developments in criminology, just as they have been slow to give up the enormously popular 
myth that wartime repressions in this country are different in quality and kind from an 
imagined peacetime norm.  For a critique of post-9/11 legal scholarship in this regard, see 
Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2011).  
For legal scholarship that recognizes the cultural and legal link between the so-called Wars 
on Terror and Crime, see, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Choosing Our Wars, Transforming 
Governance: Cancer, Crime, and Terror, in RISK AND THE WAR ON TERROR 79 (Louise 
Amoore & Marieke de Goede eds., 2008); James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the 
War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
331 (2009); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010).  
6 This inquiry is part of a larger project that examines the changes in American thought 
produced by the attacks of 9/11.  See JOSEPH MARGULIES, LIKE A SINGLE MIND: SEPTEMBER 
11 AND THE ARC OF AMERICAN THOUGHT (forthcoming 2013).  It is also part of an effort to 
place post-9/11 legal developments in their broader cultural and political context and thereby 
diminish the narrow focus on law as an explanatory variable.  For an extended discussion of 
this objective, see Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 5.  
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The loud clamor for preventive detention stands at the convergence of 
three powerful developments in contemporary American culture.  The first 
is what my colleague, the historian Michael Sherry, calls “the punitive turn 
in American life,” which refers to the angry impulse over the past several 
decades to purge the community of undesirable elements by dramatically 
increasing the government’s power to monitor, exclude, restrain, and 
imprison those considered a threat.7  The second is a dangerous refinement 
of the concept of “security,” which has merged the cultural demand for the 
elimination of risk with the impassioned rhetoric of war.8  And the third 
development is a parallel turn in the law of criminal procedure.  Over the 
past several decades, “[t]he call for protection from the state has been 
increasingly displaced by the demand for protection by the state.”9  
Criminal procedure has steadily accommodated this demand, endorsing 
what the sociologist David Garland has branded “the criminology of the 
dangerous other.”10 
Taken together, these developments have given rise to a distinct habit 
of the American mind, a characteristic way of understanding and 
responding to perceived deviance and risk.  In contemporary American 
thought, a certain type of event triggers a corresponding collection of 
mental images and sets in motion increasingly familiar solutions, all of 
which Americans describe with a predictable set of tropes.  Much of 
American society now gazes upon deviant behavior, sees only risk, and 
recognizes only one response, which it has summoned—and intensified—to 
meet the insatiable demands for security in a post-9/11 world.11 
 
7 Michael Sherry, Dead or Alive: American Vengeance Goes Global, 31 REV. INT’L 
STUD. 245, 258 (2005); MICHAEL SHERRY, GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE PUNITIVE TURN IN 
AMERICAN LIFE (forthcoming 2013); see infra notes 14–75. 
8 See infra notes 149–203. 
9 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 12 (2001). 
10 Id. at 184; see infra notes 76–88.  Naturally, these developments have encouraged and 
reinforced each other.  A willingness to purge undesirables from the community makes it 
easier to imagine and attempt to create a world without risk.  Zero tolerance for risk 
encourages judges and legislators to accept substantive claims that would have once been 
considered unimaginable.  And a determination to conceive the rule of law as a system 
designed to protect society from the depravity of a subhuman predator makes draconian 
measures seem less foreign to American sensibilities.  In the familiar way that cause 
becomes effect and effect becomes another cause, it is impossible to separate one 
development from another, but it is easy enough to see that related forces are at work and 
that they combine to produce the final condition. 
11 There is certainly nothing unusual in this.  It is precisely what Bernard Bailyn had in 
mind when he described the very different set of ideas captured in the title of his most 
famous work: 
[I]n the intense political heat of the decade after 1763, . . . ideas about the world and America’s 
place in it were fused into a comprehensive view, unique in its moral and intellectual appeal.  It 
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In this way, the cultural demand for preventive detention of alleged 
terrorists has slid into the familiar and preexisting frames about risk and 
deviance.  Because Americans know only one reaction to the problems of 
deviance and risk, they have enlisted them in response to the post-9/11 
iteration.  A belief that terrorism always reflects the act of an inherently 
malevolent disposition, for which no further explanation is possible or 
necessary, swims in the same stream as a similar view of serial sex 
offenders, juvenile super-predators, and other dangerous criminals.  The 
conviction that American foreign policy cannot be blamed for terrorism and 
that it is heresy to suggest otherwise is merely an amplification of the belief 
that society cannot be blamed for criminal conduct.  The mistrust of the 
criminal justice system, and particularly the certainty that the courts are too 
lenient and that “justice” is hamstrung by elaborate technicalities spun by 
liberal courts, elides easily into the belief that the courts cannot be trusted to 
preside over terrorism trials.  And the view that any margin of error is too 
great when dealing with apocalyptic threats naturally produces a system 
constructed so that it cannot be allowed to fail.12 
At the same time, the call for preventive detention is not simply the 
application of existing penological thought to the latest constructed crime 
wave.  Terrorists (at least Islamic terrorists) are imagined as vastly more 
dangerous than any mere criminal and therefore wholly unsuited to the 
prosaic and quotidian machinery of the criminal justice system, a condition 
confirmed by the overheated rhetoric of war.  In the popular imagination, 
war has always magnified threats and justified repression.  Whatever 
stomach society may have for peacetime risk diminishes dramatically 
 
is the development of this view to the point of overwhelming persuasiveness to the majority of 
American leaders and the meaning this view gave to the events of the time . . . that explains the 
origins of the American Revolution.  For this peculiar configuration of ideas constituted in effect 
an intellectual switchboard wired so that certain combinations of events would activate a distinct 
set of signals—danger signals, indicating hidden impulses and the likely trajectory of events 
impelled by them. 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–23 (1992). 
12 Throughout this piece, I repeatedly suggest that American thought is monolithic and 
that there is such a thing as American “society,” the views of which can be readily 
ascertained and neatly summarized.  This is done only to avoid the repeated use of modifiers 
that signal substantial rather than universal agreement with the point being made.  The 
punitive turn has been broadly accepted by a bipartisan segment of the American population 
and has given rise to what sociologists and political scientists call “a hegemonic discourse.”  
See, e.g., David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (2007) (“Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode 
of discourse and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices 
to the point where it has become incorporated into the commonsense way we interpret, live 
in, and understand the world.”).  Naturally, this discourse is not universal, and a significant 
alternative can be heard, particularly in academia.  But my concern is with the dominant 
narrative, and the reader will forgive me if I seem to treat it as the only one. 
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during war when any willingness to accept risk is attacked as dangerously 
foolhardy.  The cultural response to 9/11 in general, and the call for 
preventive detention in particular, has thus intensified and sharpened the 
frames of risk and deviance that were borrowed from modern 
criminology.13 
II. THE PUNITIVE TURN IN AMERICAN LIFE 
The numbers are still sobering, notwithstanding their depressing 
familiarity.  Approximately 2,300,000 people are in prison or jail—at least 
as of yearend 2009—more than every man, woman, and child in Detroit, 
San Francisco, and St. Paul combined.14  It is both the largest prison 
population and the highest incarceration rate in the world,15 and has been 
accommodated by an astounding growth in prison capacity: from 1985 to 
2000, on average, a new state or federal prison opened in the United States 
every week.16  As of 2008, more than 41,000 men and women in the United 
 
13 This also explains why the official response to 9/11, which so vehemently resists 
invocation of the criminal model, would nonetheless draw so heavily on modern 
criminological thought.  Quite simply, this is how American society has learned to deal with 
problems of deviance and risk, regardless of whether the response is denominated crime-
control or warfare.  It is now what comes most naturally.  For a similar, and eerily prescient, 
discussion of the use of the new penological tools and rhetoric in the setting of a war on 
terror, see Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: the Emerging New 
Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 193–96 (David Nelken ed., 1994) 
(comparing Israel’s response to the first intifada with America’s response to the growing 
“urban underclass”). 
14 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2009, at 7 app. tbl.2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cpus09.pdf [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 2009].  With respect to the total 
prison population, there is at least some reason to hope.  The total number of people 
incarcerated in 2009 fell by approximately 48,000, which was the first annual decline since 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics began reporting the data in 1980.  Id. at tbl.1.  The 
incarceration rate has declined steadily since the early 1980s.  Id.  Joseph Kennedy used this 
same rhetorical devise more than ten years ago, pointing out that “we have more people 
under criminal justice supervision than we have living in Indiana, Washington, Missouri, 
Tennessee, Wisconsin, Maryland, or any one of thirty other states and that we currently have 
enough jail and prison capacity to incarcerate every woman, man, and child in Manhattan 
with room to spare.”  Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity 
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 832 (2000).  Since then, the numbers 
have grown considerably. 
15 ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLL. LONDON, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD 
PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/ 
law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.  Though the United States clearly has the 
highest incarceration rate in the world, the total number of prisoners in China may be 
modestly higher than in the United States, depending on the number of people held by the 
Chinese government in “administrative detention.”  Id. at 3 tbl.2, 4 tbl.3. 
16 MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 1–2 (2d ed. 2006). 
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States were serving life sentences without the possibility of parole.17  
Another five million are on probation or parole—again, far more than any 
country in the world.18  And the racial impact of these numbers is even 
more dispiriting.  African Americans are eight times more likely to be 
incarcerated than whites.  As of 2004, over twelve percent of African-
American males between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine were in 
custody. 19  And for under-educated young black men, the incarceration 
rates are astounding: in 2000, nearly one in five African-American men 
under the age of forty-one who had not attended college was in prison or 
jail.20  The extent to which incarceration has become part of the normal life 
experience for African-American men is simply staggering.  As Bruce 
Western recently observed, 
The criminal justice system has become so pervasive that we should count prisons and 
jails among the key institutions that shape the life course of recent birth cohorts of 
African American men.  By the end of the 1990s, black men with little schooling were 
more likely to be in prison or jail than to be in a labor union or enrolled in a 
government welfare or training program.  Black men born in the late 1960s were more 
likely, by 1999, to have served time in state or federal prison than to have obtained a 
four-year degree or served in the military.  For non-college black men, a prison record 
had become twice as common as military service.21 
The punitive turn has produced not only a great many more prisoners 
and prisons.  It has also generated a fondness—in fact, an enthusiasm—for 
harsh conditions of confinement that was unthinkable only a few decades 
ago.  Though prisons as a whole have become stunningly cruel places, this 
trend is perhaps best illustrated by the dramatic growth in supermax 
facilities.  In 1984, only one prison in the United States fit the description of 
a supermax—the federal prison at Marion, Illinois, after the lockdown 
imposed in 1983.22  Twenty years later, there were supermax prisons in 
forty-four states holding approximately 25,000 inmates.23  The Federal 
 
17 Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole 
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 27 (2010). 
18 CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 2009, supra note 14, at 2 tbl.1. 
19 BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3 (2006).   
20 Id. at 3, 16–17.  
21 Id. at 31.  
22 See Leena Kurki and Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of 
Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 385 (2001). 
23 Lance Tapley, The Worst of the Worst: Supermax Torture in America, BOSTON REV., 
Nov./Dec. 2010, at 30.  Counting the number of prisoners in supermax is often complicated 
by a lack of consensus on what constitutes a supermax facility.  In Mears’s research, 95% of 
supermax wardens agreed on the following definition: “A supermax is defined as a stand-
alone unit or part of another facility and is designated for violent or disruptive inmates.  It 
typically involves up to 23-hours per day, single-cell confinement for an indefinite period of 
time.  Inmates in supermax housing have minimal contact with staff and other inmates.”  
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Bureau of Prisons also operates a supermax at Florence, Colorado, which 
houses another 11,000 inmates, including a number who have been 
convicted of terrorist-related offenses.24 
Conditions at supermax prisons vary modestly from state to state and 
from states to the federal facility, but in general they are characterized by 
strict isolation and rigorously enforced, unrelenting control.25  Supermax 
prisons have abandoned even the pretense that they are meant to rehabilitate 
or reform.  The facility typically provides little or no programming, 
education, or counseling—nothing more than the barest constitutional 
minima.26  Prisoners, who are routinely described as “the worst of the 
worst,”27 spend nearly every minute of every day confined in a small cell 
made of concrete and steel.  Norval Morris once described the cells at 
Tamms, the Illinois supermax, where conditions are representative: 
Your cell measures ten feet by twelve feet.  It is made of poured concrete with a steel 
door—no bars—just a lot of little holes, smaller than the tip of your finger, punched 
through it.  You have a stainless steel toilet and sink built as a unit that would not be 
easy to destroy.  There is a small window, high and narrow, that lets in a little outside 
light.  There is a mirror made of polished metal, again tending to be indestructible.  
Your bunk or bed, or whatever you may call it, is also of poured concrete, an integral 
part of the cell, but you have a slim plastic foam mattress to put on it.  There is a well-
protected fluorescent light and a light switch.  At night . . . , the light cannot be turned 
off entirely; it unrestrainedly gives out a dim light, bright enough for the guards to 
peer in at you.  There is a small trapdoor, low down on the steel door to your cell, 
through which your food can be pushed to you.28 
 
Daniel P. Mears, A Critical Look at Supermax Prisons, 30 CORR. COMPENDIUM 6, 49 n.3 
(2005). 
24 Tapley, supra note 23, at 30. 
25 For a discussion of the minor variations in conditions at supermax prisons, see Kurki 
& Morris, supra note 22, at 394–410.  See also, e.g., Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (describing supermax in Texas); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing conditions at Pelican Bay, in California); HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RED ONION STATE PRISON: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY 
CONFINEMENT IN VIRGINIA (1999). 
26 Kurki & Morris, supra note 22, at 407. 
27 See, e.g., Laura LaFay, 7 New Prisons Will Handle Growing Inmate Count, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 23, 1997, at A1 (“Red Onion, which will house 1,267 prisoners and 
employ about 400 people, has been designed for what Corrections Director Ron Angelone 
likes to call ‘the worst of the worst.’  ‘These are hardcore, violent, predatory individuals who 
are a risk to other individuals and to staff,’ he said.”); Cathy Frye, ‘Super Max’ Slated to 
House ‘Worst of Worst,’ ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1999, at 1A; Karen Grigsby 
Bates, Moussaoui’s New Home: A Cell in Super Max Prison, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 4, 
2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5382725 (stating that the 
federal supermax at Florence “is designed to isolate what’s often described as the worst of 
the worst of the prison population”). 
28 Kurki & Morris, supra note 22, at 395. 
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Within this space, prisoners are deliberately confined so they cannot 
see or touch another human being.  At Tamms, and only with great 
difficulty, they can communicate with other inmates by shouting through 
tiny spaces where the food trap meets imperfectly with the remainder of the 
steel door—an opportunity considered a design defect at Tamms and since 
remedied at other supermax prisons.29  Prisoners average more than twenty-
three hours a day in solitary confinement.  They are allowed out of their 
cells a few hours a week for exercise—anywhere from one to five, 
depending on their disciplinary status—and never more than an hour a 
day.30  They cannot leave their cells unless they are first heavily shackled 
and manacled, and only when escorted by several guards wearing riot gear 
and armor.  Exercise, like everything in their lives, is an entirely solitary 
affair.  At Tamms, they are brought to a concrete cage somewhat larger than 
their cell, “with a small grating high in the corner of the roof through which 
you can see the sky.”  There is no exercise equipment, “but some prisoners 
are now allowed to have tough rubber handballs to throw against the walls 
of the yard.”31 
Meanwhile, outside the prison walls, mass incarceration has been 
complemented by an elaborate system of social controls targeted at the 
populations considered mostly likely to place the rest of society at risk.  
Most felons lose their right to vote, in some cases for life, which makes 
them irrelevant to the electoral process.32  In addition, the modern penal 
system frequently also restricts their right to serve on a jury,33 to live within 
 
29 Id. at 398. 
30 Id. at 395–96. 
31 Id. at 395. 
32 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL STATUTES 
IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf [hereinafter OPA FEDERAL 
SUMMARY] (“The great majority of states impose some type of restriction on the ability of 
convicted felons to vote.”); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, 
in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 51 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (“Forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia do not permit prison inmates to vote; thirty-two states disenfranchise felons on 
parole; and twenty-eight disenfranchise felons on probation.  In addition, in thirteen states a 
felony conviction can result in disenfranchisement, generally for life, even after an offender 
has completed his or her sentence.”). 
33 OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 2–3 (stating that a conviction in federal or 
state court of any crime punishable by more than one year prohibits an individual from 
serving on a federal grand or petit jury, absent a pardon); Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & 
Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal 
Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 297 (2006) (finding forty-seven 
states restrict an individual’s right to serve on a jury after a felony conviction). 
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designated locations or in public housing,34 to travel or assemble within 
certain portions of a community,35 to participate in most social welfare 
programs,36 to receive college or small business loans,37 and to work in 
various professions.38  In the aggregate, the result of these policies is the 
near replication of the colonial state of “civil death,” a condition in which a 
person is deprived of all political, civil, and legal rights, except those he 
may enjoy when he is inevitably prosecuted again.39  His status as a person 
with rights, in other words, operates only in connection with his conjoined 
status as an accused or convicted criminal. 
 
34 OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 4 (stating that federal courts “may impose 
certain occupational restrictions as a condition of probation or supervised release”); Jeremy 
Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, 
at 15, 24 (“The Public Housing Assessment System, established by the federal government, 
creates financial incentives for public housing agencies to adopt strict admission and eviction 
standards to screen out individuals who engage in criminal behavior.”). 
35 For residence restriction of sex offenders, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY 
ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 100 (2007) (“At least 20 states have enacted laws 
that prohibit certain sex offenders from living within a specified distance of schools, daycare 
centers, parks, and other places where children congregate . . . .  In addition, hundreds of 
municipalities (in states with and without residency restriction statutes) have also passed 
similar ordinances . . . .”).  For restrictions on the right to move freely within a community, 
but not targeted at sex offenders alone, see generally KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE 
HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2010).  For related 
restrictions on the right to travel, see Travis, supra note 34, at 24 (“In 1992, Congress passed 
a law requiring states to revoke or suspend the drivers’ licenses of people convicted of drug 
felonies, or suffer the loss of 10 percent of the state’s federal highway funds.”). 
36 Travis, supra note 34, at 23 (noting that after welfare reform law was enacted in 1996, 
the federal government required states to “permanently bar individuals with drug-related 
felony convictions from receiving federally funded public assistance and food stamps during 
their lifetime”).  Drug offenders may also be denied federal retirement benefits, Social 
Security, disability, and benefits for military service.  Additionally, individuals convicted of 
drug-related and fraud-related felonies are permanently excluded from any federal health 
care program and certain state health care programs.  See OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra 
note 32, at 8–9. 
37 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 158 (1999); Travis, 
supra note 34, at 24 (“The Higher Education Act of 1998 suspends the eligibility for a 
student loan or other assistance for someone convicted of a drug-related offense.”). 
38 Felons are barred from a number of different professions, including most commonly 
employment that requires contact with children, health service positions, and security 
services.  In some states, however, this prohibition has been extended to positions like 
acupuncturist and cosmetologist.  Uggen, Manza & Thompson, supra note 33, at 298. 
39 See, e.g., id. at 296 (“[F]ormer felons must fulfill the duties of citizenship, but their 
conviction status effectively denies their rights to participate in social life.”); Travis, supra 
note 34, at 19 (“[T]hese punishments have become instruments of ‘social exclusion;’ they 
create a permanent diminution in social status of convicted offenders, a distancing between 
‘us’ and ‘them.’”). 
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But many judges and communities have taken these steps still further 
and have embraced shaming ceremonies.  Certain categories of ex-offenders 
are publicly identified, obligated to announce themselves to their 
community or their victims, or to wear distinctive clothing or brand 
themselves by certain activity. 
Some municipalities, for example, publish offenders’ names in newspapers or even on 
billboards, a disposition that is especially common for men convicted of soliciting 
prostitutes.  Other jurisdictions broadcast the names of various types of offenders on 
community-access television channels. . . .  Some judges order petty thieves to wear t-
shirts announcing their crimes.  Others achieve the same effect with brightly colored 
bracelets that read “DUI Convict,” “I Write Bad Checks,” and the like.  One judge 
ordered a woman to wear a sign declaring “I am a convicted child molester.”40   
These penalties seem to be limited only by official imagination.  Some 
jurisdictions insist that offenders publicly debase themselves.  They must 
stand in the local courthouse with a sign describing their offense, for 
example, or publicize their own convictions in a first-person narrative.41  
“In Maryland, . . . juvenile offenders must apologize on their hands and 
knees and are released from confinement only if they persuade their victims 
that their remorse is sincere.”42 
* * * * 
The profligate cruelty of the criminal justice system is merely a 
symptom of the punitive turn in American life and not the condition itself.  
Like a fever, it is a sign that the body suffers from a dangerous malady.  But 
no one should suppose it is the only symptom—the evidence for the 
punitive turn courses through nearly all of American society.  And one 
 
40 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 632 
(1996) (internal citations omitted).  Professor Kahan believes that shaming penalties 
represent a “feasible alternative to imprisonment for many offenses.”  Id. at 594.  For a 
contrary view, see James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).  Professor Whitman properly focuses on the harm of shaming 
penalties to society, rather than to the offender: 
The most compelling arguments against such humiliation sanctions do not, in fact, involve the 
way they deal with the offender at all . . . .  In the last analysis, we should think of shame 
sanctions as wrong because they involve a species of lynch justice, and a peculiarly disturbing 
species of lynch justice at that—a species of official lynch justice.  The chief evil in public 
humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and politically dangerous, complicity between 
the state and the crowd . . . .  They represent an unacceptable style of governance through their 
play on public psychology. 
Id. at 1059.  Or, as John McCain would later say in a distinctly post-9/11 context, “It’s not 
about who they are.  It’s about who we are.”  151 CONG. REC. S8792 (2005) (debate over 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/s072505.html. 
41 Kahan, supra note 40, at 633. 
42 Id. at 634. 
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place it is particularly apparent is in popular culture.  At mid-century, 
deviance was consistently portrayed as the product of social conditions 
beyond the individual’s control.43  The highest social value was strict 
adherence to the rule of law, regardless of the outcome in a particular 
case,44 and the purpose of the criminal justice system was to realign the 
offender with society.45  Today, by contrast, deviance is depicted as the 
result of innate evil for which society bears no responsibility but suffers all 
the consequences, and which the criminal law naïvely protects.46 
The movies 12 Angry Men,47 released in 1957, and To Kill a 
Mockingbird,48 released in 1962, for instance, signaled a reverence for the 
law rather than a cheap attachment to a particular outcome.49  Atticus Finch, 
the hero of To Kill a Mockingbird, “evokes the heroic imagery of both 
individuals dedicated to the law and law itself as an heroic institution 
restraining the baser human instincts.”50  The movie conceives the law as a 
protection against a mob mentality and as superior to the desires and fears 
of individuals.51  In the same way, 12 Angry Men brings the American into 
the jury room and reveals the institution’s “great practical and symbolic 
importance in the American system of justice.”52  Consistently, the media 
 
43 Nicole Rafter, American Criminal Trial Films: An Overview of Their Development, 
1930–2000, 28 J.L. & SOC’Y 9, 15 (2001) (depicting film in the 1950s through the 1960s as a 
demonstration of America’s reverence for the law).  “[T]he classic courtroom movies present 
them as professional wizards and guardians of the country’s sacred traditions.” Id. 
44 TIMOTHY O. LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME STORIES 
45–76 (2003). 
45 E.g., James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ 
Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models, 48 AM. SOC’Y CRIMINOLOGY 99, 102 
(2010) (“[I]n the 1960s, the public was more willing to confront crime with a two-prong 
approach: reduce the root causes of crime, such as poverty and unemployment, while 
providing offenders the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.  The lack of support for the 
death penalty is evidence of this less punitive approach toward crime.”).  
46 Francis T. Cullen et. al., Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 2 (2000) (“‘Get tough’ thinking and policies have replaced calls for more 
humanistic correctional practices, and their dominance appears unassailable.”). 
47 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957). 
48 TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962). 
49 LENZ, supra note 44. 
50 Id. at 46; see also Maureen E. Markey, Natural Law, Positive Law, and Conflicting 
Social Norms in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 162, 190 (2010) 
(“Atticus shows great respect, even reverence, for the rule of law, the established legal code 
of this country as reflected in the Constitution.”). 
51 Markey, supra note 50, at 191 (“His calm and steady rationalism and his absolute 
belief in his moral position enable him to calmly face down, with nothing more than a 
newspaper in his hand, a lynch mob who come to abduct his client.”). 
52 LENZ, supra note 44, at 45. 
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separated sin from sinner.  The 1939 film, They Made Me a Criminal,53 for 
example, emphasized that criminals are a product of their environment.54  
And the 1937 film Dead End55 and 1938 film Angels with Dirty Faces56 
gave humanizing portrayals of criminals in order to separate judgments of 
the person from the condemnation of the crime.57 
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, media portrayals began to 
change.58  The relationship between the accused and society became 
oppositional.  Instead of a desire to understand the criminal and help 
rehabilitate him, society began to view him as a plague that needed to be 
controlled.  Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry59 in 1971 is prototypical.  In the 
film, the law becomes a partner in crime.  “The injustice is obvious: the law 
prevents a crazed killer from being convicted of anything.”60  Clint 
Eastwood throws away his badge and takes it upon himself to see that 
justice is done.  The message is unmistakable: if the law gets in the way, we 
should throw it out. 
This transformation—from law as the object of reverence in films like 
To Kill a Mockingbird to law as a hypertechnical obstacle to justice in films 
like Dirty Harry—is now essentially complete.  Rare is the film or 
television series that presents law as anything other than an obstacle to the 
punitive impulse in American life.61  Representative in this vein is the 
contemporary Showtime series, Dexter, which features the serial killer as an 
unlikely protagonist.  The show’s hero, Dexter Morgan, works in a police 
 
53 THEY MADE ME A CRIMINAL (Warner Bros. Pictures 1939). 
54 LENZ, supra note 44, at 47 (“The title of They Made Me a Criminal (1939) actually 
describes one of the tenants of the liberal theory of criminology, the belief that criminals are 
made, not born, that crime is caused by nurture not nature.”). 
55 DEAD END (Samuel Goldwyn Co. 1937). 
56 ANGELS WITH DIRTY FACES (Warner Bros. Pictures 1938). 
57 LENZ, supra note 44, at 48 (“The liberal message of this film is that individuals are 
basically good and that institutions . . . have a very important role to play in ensuring that 
individuals become productive, law-abiding citizens.”). 
58 Joseph R. Dominick, Crime and Law Enforcement on Prime-Time Television, 37 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 241, 241 (1973) (“During the unrest of the late 1960s . . . [p]opular reaction 
ranged from an increased demand for law and order to a diminished respect for law 
enforcement, especially among young people.”).  By the 1990s, the transformation was all 
but complete.  See Rafter, supra note 43, at 20 (“Reflecting actual criminal trials (such as 
those involving O.J. Simpson and the assailants of Rodney King), in which justice seemed to 
many to have gone astray, courtroom films of the nineties mistrusted the criminal justice 
system’s ability to accomplish its mission.”). 
59 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1971). 
60 LENZ, supra note 44, at 111.  
61 Rafter, supra note 43, at 20 (2001) (“Many began with the assumption that the system 
was broken beyond repair.”). 
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station as a blood spatter analyst by day, but as a serial killer by night.62  He 
sees first-hand the repeated failures of the criminal justice system and 
actively works to keep his “targets” off the law enforcement radar so that 
the law does not interfere with his heroic brand of vigilante justice.63  When 
the community finally discovers that a serial killer is killing only murderers, 
it dubs him the “dark avenger” and creates a comic book series and action 
figure after him.64 
Interestingly, Dexter never kills without first taking meticulous steps 
to ensure his target’s guilt.  The criminals look normal, as though they were 
one of us.  It is possible to be mistaken, therefore, and a liberal society 
cannot tolerate the cold-blooded murder of an innocent person.  Before an 
audience will accept that justice must be done, Dexter must convince them 
of the target’s guilt.  So, under the watchful eye of the television audience, 
he checks records and compares fingerprints.  Once the audience has been 
dutifully reassured, Dexter may dispatch the victim with the vigilante 
justice that has come to define contemporary culture.  In that way, the show 
introduces the dilemma of the monster hidden in our midst, and suggests 
that law enforcement, if unfettered by the law, can solve the problem 
accurately and quickly. 
More recently, another series presents a different solution to a similar 
problem.  In The Event, an alien race has reached the United States with an 
unknown and therefore potentially dangerous agenda.  Unfortunately for us, 
they look and act exactly as we do, except that they do not age.  The 
government is keeping a small number of them captive, without criminal 
charges, until they may uncover the remainder.65  One of the major figures 
in the show is an unscrupulous lawyer who spouts the rhetoric of rights and 
the rule of law.  But she in fact is an alien who plans a revolution against 
the United States.  The symbolism is obvious.  “They” are aliens who, 
though they look like us, are fundamentally different and intend our 
destruction.  To be safe, we must detain them indefinitely, without charges, 
while we take the steps necessary to protect the community.  But they have 
hijacked the law, and have begun to use our rights to destroy us.  We must 
 
62 Dexter (Showtime television broadcast); see Watch Dexter on Showtime: America’s 
Favorite Serial Killer, http://www.sho.com/site/dexter/about.do (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
63 Id. (“When he’s not helping the homicide division solve murders, he satisfies his dark 
desires by hunting and killing bad guys who slip through the justice system.”). 
64 Dexter, Episode Guide: Season 2 Episode 5: The Dark Defender, 
http://www.sho.com/site/dexter/episodes.do?seriesid=323&seasonid=2&episodeid=130352 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
65 The Event: I Haven’t Told You Everything (NBC television broadcast Sept. 20, 2010). 
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be vigilant and recognize that the law was meant for us and not for them.66  
It is the modern morality tale for preventive detention. 
And then, of course, there is the much-commented upon FOX 
Television series 24, where Jack Bauer tortured a new prisoner every week, 
always to brilliant effect.  During its seven-year run, 24 was wildly popular.  
Websites now call for Jack Bauer as president, 67 even though in the course 
of a single season (that is, a single cinematic day), Bauer tortured his 
brother, shot his boss, and executed a prisoner so he could retrieve a piece 
of information the prisoner had swallowed.  A number of observers have 
asked how or whether 24, with its relentless normalization of torture, may 
have affected American culture.68  The conservative Heritage Foundation, 
for instance, hosted an event in June 2006 entitled, “24 and America’s 
Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction, or Does it Matter?”  Rush 
Limbaugh moderated and Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, appeared as one of the panelists.69  Though the change may not be 
attributable to 24 alone, it is certainly the case that 9/11 marked a turning 
point in the cultural portrayal of torture.  Even in the most punitive 
moments of the last quarter of the twentieth century, torture was invariably 
presented in popular culture as a tool used by the demonic other against the 
(usually) American hero.  After 9/11, however, torture became part of the 
American hero’s arsenal.  Before, the cultural message was that America 
would prevail despite torture.  Today, by contrast, the message is that 
America would prevail because of torture.70 
* * * * 
 
66 See The Event: To Keep Us Safe (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2010). 
67 For example, in Janauary 2010, a Facebook page entitled “Jack Bauer for President” 
was created, inviting “everyone who thinks we would be better off if Jack Bauer were 
President of the United States” to join.  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Jack-
Bauer-For-President/268683864258?sk=info (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); see also JACK 
BAUER FOR PRESIDENT: TERRORISM AND POLITICS IN 24 (Richard Miniter ed., 2008).   
68 See, e.g., Dennis Broe, Fox and Its Friends: Global Commodification and the New 
Cold War, 43 CINEMA J. 97 (2004); Steven Keslowitz, The Simpsons, 24 and the Law: How 
Homer Simpson and Jack Bauer Influence Congressional Lawmaking and Judicial 
Reasoning, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2787 (2008). 
69 See 24 and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction, or Does it Matter? 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 23, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/events/2006/06/ 
24-and-americas-image-in-fighting-terrorism-fact-fiction-or-does-it-matter. 
70 “From 2002 through 2005, the Parents Television Council counted 624 torture scenes 
in prime time, a six-fold increase. UCLA’s Television Violence Monitoring Project reports 
‘torture on TV shows is significantly higher than it was five years ago and the characters 
who torture have changed.  It used to be that only villains on television tortured.  Today, 
“good guy” and heroic American characters torture—and this torture is depicted as 
necessary, effective and even patriotic.’”  Maura Moynihan, Torture Chic: Why Is the Media 
Glorifying Inhumane, Sadistic Behavior?, ALTERNET (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/424739. 
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Scholars have advanced an impressive set of explanations for the 
punitive turn in the United States.  Political, sociological, racial, and 
economic imperatives have all figured in the literature.71  The answer is 
undoubtedly complex; no major shift in American culture could possibly 
owe its genesis to a single factor.  Some explanations are more compelling 
than others.  Conservative writers, for instance, have suggested that 
dramatically harsher sentences can be traced to legitimate public outcry 
over a sharp increase in crime.72  But the data do not bear this out.  As 
Katherine Beckett has shown, public concern about crime and safety came 
after elites began to press it as an issue; in some instances only after crime 
rates had begun to decline.  This suggests the “crisis” was, like most social 
crises, constructed.73  But legitimate debates over causes should not obscure 
 
71 See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 8 (2007) (“[M]ass 
incarceration is an inevitable effect of reshaping political authority around crime.”); Sherry, 
supra note 7, at 249–54 (canvassing various explanations but maintaining that “the core of 
the urge to imprison was fear of a newly jobless marauding underclass . . . .”); Jonathan 
Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 217, 221 (2001) (discussing explanations “rooted in three distinct theoretical traditions 
in contemporary sociology: Political Economy, Cultural Interpretation, and Governmental 
Rationalities”); Unnever & Cullen, supra note 45, at 101, 119 (examining three explanations 
for the punitive turn, “the escalating crime-distrust model, the moral decline model, and the 
racial-animus model,” and concluding that “one of the most salient and consistent predictors 
of American punitiveness is racial animus”). 
72 KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS 55–61 (1997). 
73 Id. at 56–57; see also Stuart A. Scheingold, Constructing the New Political 
Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal State, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857 
(1998).  Researchers have long recognized that the perception of crime is shaped much more 
by crime reporting than by the actual incidence of criminal behavior.  See, e.g., F. James 
Davis, Crime News in Colorado Newspapers, 57 AM. J. SOC. 325 (1952).  For an early and 
influential discussion of deviance as a socially constructed category, see HOWARD BECKER, 
OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 7–18 (1963).  Sadly, the gap between 
reality and reporting continues to distort criminal justice policy, as alarmist accounts 
continue to create the perception of peril.  For a discussion of this in the context of juvenile 
crime, see, e.g., Ernestine S. Gray, Media—Don’t Believe the Hype, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 45, 47 (2003) (“Clearly, the amount and quality of coverage by the media given to 
issue of juvenile crime by the media does not reflect the reality of juvenile crime.”); Franklin 
E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological Battleground, 
11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (1999) (“In the middle of the largest sustained decline in violent 
crime in 30 years, these predictions of a ‘coming storm’ [of juvenile violence] suggest that 
the Holy War about juvenile justice was neither wholly nor mainly a reaction to levels of 
crime in the streets.”).  The constructionist literature is voluminous.  For a survey of the 
literature and an attempt to lend it some empirical support, see THEODORE SASSON, CRIME 
TALK: HOW CITIZENS CONSTRUCT A SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995). 
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broad consensus over the phenomenon itself.74  No one credibly doubts that 
American society has become distinctly more punitive in the past four 
decades,75 and that the punitive turn has included a major change in the 
explanation for deviant behavior, which has in turn fundamentally altered 
what is regarded as the state’s proper response.  As never before, an 
obsession with controlling deviance by eliminating risk dominates 
American culture. 
III. THE NEW PENOLOGY 
It is not my goal to critique the punitive turn in American life.  That 
has been amply and ably done by the authors cited in the notes.  My interest 
is in the connection between the punitive turn and the demand for 
preventive detention.  To that end, it is enough to note that the punitive turn 
represents two linked developments in American thought.  The first is the 
recurring creation in the public mind of the monster-criminal, a beast 
beyond redemption or reform that is innately hostile to the community.  
And the second is a dramatic decline in the faith of the rehabilitative ideal 
as the proper response to this beast.76  The former has changed who and 
what we imagine the deviant to be, while the latter has changed how society 
should respond.  In the last several decades, and especially since the early 
1980s, the criminal has been reimagined from one of us—a person for 
whom society bears some responsibility and who must therefore be 
reformed and rehabilitated—to one of them—a monster who must be 
separated from us and whose behavior must be monitored and controlled.  
Society’s responsibility is not to reform, since that is impossible.  Crime, 
and particularly violent crime, is inevitable, since criminals are 
irredeemable.77 
 
74 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 9, at 2 (“We still do not really know how we got from 
there to here and why the crime control future—which is the present we now inhabit—turned 
out to be so different from the one that was widely expected a generation ago.”); SIMON, 
supra note 71, at 25 (“The question of causation is fascinating but ultimately less important 
that the question of what the ‘war on crime’ actually does to American democracy, our 
government and legal system, and the open society we have historically enjoyed.”).  
75 See, e.g., Cullen, supra note 46, at 28–31 (reviewing literature and opinion polling to 
document this shift). 
76 Ironically, the earliest attacks on the rehabilitative ideal came from the political left, 
which attacked the idea of rehabilitation as simply another constructed political category, 
and therefore an illegitimate form of state control and a subterfuge for enforced conformity.  
See, e.g., FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 32–59 (1981); 
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971). 
77 Jonathan Simon has described the convergence of these two ideas in the context of the 
criminal justice response to sex offenders: 
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In response to the criminal as beast, modern criminal justice policy has 
burdened itself with the Sisyphean task of controlling the uncontrollable.  
The problem is not crime per se, which has declined steadily over the last 
two decades, but the image of crime in the public mind.  Because the 
monster does not walk the street so much as haunt the imagination, he 
casually shrugs off the pathetic attempts at social control repeatedly fired at 
him by an anxious state.  Nothing in the arsenal of the modern state can 
solve the problem of a mythical beast.  Like dragons, he disappears only 
when people stop believing that he exists.78  But having created him, 
politicians and pundits find it hard to let him go.  The state is left, therefore, 
with the challenge of feigning control, which requires the creation of ever 
more repressive, ever more draconian systems of supervision and 
management, all with an eye to reassuring a frightened population that the 
monster, though still at large, can at least be kept at bay.79 
So explains what has been called the new penology, in which the faith 
that the offender is one of us has given way to the belief that he is not; the 
goal that he be reformed has given way to the certainty that reform is 
impossible; and the ambition that he eventually be returned to society has 
given way to the conviction that society is much better off without him.80  
 
The new generation of sex offender laws represents a shift toward the new penology combined 
with a strong appeal to populist punitiveness.  This takes the form of managerialism . . . 
combined with gestures of identification with populist sentiments evoked by sex crimes.  The 
new penology is generally agnostic toward treatment.  The goal is waste management.  Populist 
punitiveness is exceedingly hostile toward medicalization.  The result is an important 
transformation of the sex offender from the most obvious example of crime as disease back to an 
earlier conception of crime as monstrosity.  Sex offenders are our modern-day monsters, 
producing tidal waves of public demand. 
Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 452, 456 (1998) (emphasis added).  Simon is aware of his 
penchant for “perhaps overstated” polemics.  See SIMON, supra note 71, at 4 (recognizing 
that the title claim of the book—“that the American elite are ‘governing through crime’—is 
polemical, and perhaps overstated”). 
78 For an account of the life cycle of the dangerous sex offender in the public 
imagination, see PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD 
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998). 
79 See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter 
trans., Sage Publications 1992) (1986); SIMON, supra note 71, at 238 (“The federal 
government and at least some states, including highly visible ones like Florida, Texas, and 
California, have begun to make rituals of reassurance a primary government activity.”); 
Ulrich Beck, The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 39 (2002) (“The hidden central issue in world risk society is how to feign control over 
the uncontrollable.”) (emphasis added). 
80 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 9, at 1–16; Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes 
of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the 
Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New 
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The dominant goal of penal policy has shifted from social welfare to social 
control.81  The “master plan” of the new penology calls for the 
identification, management, and control of those who would do the 
community harm.82  And because the harm the dangerous super-predator 
would do is imagined to be apocalyptic, society cannot wait for the harm to 
occur.  Instead, it must act today, and impose its rule based not on 
completed conduct but on future risk.83  In the new penology, the role of the 
state in dealing with dangerous crime is not simply to punish what was 
done, but to prevent what may yet occur.84  The bloodless sciences of risk 
management and actuarial assessment achieve special prominence.85  And 
because society must attempt to manage risks of nearly unimaginable 
magnitude, it must make assessments based on predictions of group 
behavior.  Anything else is dangerously inefficient.  People are relevant not 
for who they are, but for the group to which they belong, and thus for the 
calculated risk they pose.86  In the new penology, the individual is an 
afterthought. 
In service of this aspiration, the entire architecture of modern 
criminology has been steadily reconfigured.  Prison has been recast in the 
American mind from “a mechanism of reform and rehabilitation” to “a 
means of incapacitation and punishment that satisfies popular demands for 
public safety and harsh retribution.”87  A dissatisfaction with “experts,” 
whose views are derided as naïve and anachronistic, has left a vacuum that 
is increasingly filled by a populist and bipartisan demand for ever-more 
 
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992). 
81  BECKETT, supra note 72, at 10.  Beckett credits Craig Reinerman for this turn of 
phrase.  See Craig Reinerman, The Social Construction of an Alcohol Problem: The Case of 
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY & SOC’Y 91 
(1988). 
82 See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND 
CLASSIFICATION 13–39 (1985). 
83 See Clifford Shearing, Punishment and the Changing Face of Governance, 3 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 203 (2001). 
84 See CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE 
RISE OF CCTV 25 (1999). 
85 See, e.g., Pat O’Malley, Risk and Responsibility, in FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON: 
LIBERALISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 189, 194 (Andrew 
Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas Rose eds., 1996) (stating that the actuarial focus on 
amoral categories rather than individuals is taken as a source of efficiency which reduces 
opposition). 
86 E.g., Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 771, 773 (1988) (“Actuarial practices are emerging as a dominant force because they 
further intensify the effectiveness of power set into motion by the rise of the disciplines.”). 
87 GARLAND, supra note 9, at 14. 
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repressive punishments.88  The crime victim speaks with unique authority 
while the law is subjected to particular scorn.  Sanctions are too weak, 
procedures are too technical, and public security is needlessly sacrificed in 
favor of criminals’ “rights.” 
Representative in this vein is the tragic rise and fall of the juvenile 
“super-predator.”  Violent juvenile crime rose precipitously in the mid 
1980s, which triggered a sudden and widespread alarm.  In 1995, the 
conservative scholar James Q. Wilson wrote, “we are terrified by the 
prospect of innocent people being gunned down at random, without 
warning, and almost without motive, by youngsters who afterwards show us 
the blank, unremorseful face of a feral, pre-social being.”89  But it was 
Wilson’s former student, former Princeton criminologist John DiIulio, who 
gets the credit for coming up with the “super-predator” moniker.  In a 
much-cited article in the Weekly Standard, he expressed dismay at a “youth 
crime wave” of “horrific proportions from coast to coast.”90  But these were 
not “normal” criminals, DiIulio said.  They were “hardened, remorseless” 
predators with “absolutely no respect for human life,” more dangerous than 
the most vicious adult criminals, who “make even the leaders of the Bloods 
and Crips . . . look tame by comparison.”91  And just to dispel all doubt, 
DiIulio assured us he was no timid naïf: 
I will still waltz backwards, notebook in hand and alone, into any adult maximum-
security cellblock full of killers, rapists, and muggers.  But a few years ago, I forswore 
research inside juvenile lock-ups.  The buzz of impulsive violence, the vacant stares 
and smiles, and the remorseless eyes were at once too frightening and too 
depressing . . . .92 
But as bad as matters had become, DiIulio insisted it was about to get 
much worse.  “[W]hat is really frightening everyone,” he said, “is not 
what’s happening now but what’s just around the corner—namely, a sharp 
increase in the number of super crime-prone young males.”  On the horizon, 
DiIulio foresaw “tens of thousands” of “juvenile super-predators,” a tidal 
wave of violence and mayhem “that hasn’t yet begun to crest”:93 
 
88 See, e.g., Franklin Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of 
Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 252–
56 (1996). 
89 James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME 489, 492 (James Q. Wilson and 
Joan Petersilia eds., 1995).  
90 John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 
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They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence 
for the most trivial reasons . . . .  They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of 
imprisonment.  They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code that 
reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality.  In prison or out, 
the things that super-predators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money—
are their own immediate rewards.  Nothing else matters to them.  So for as long as 
their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes “naturally”: murder, rape, 
rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.94 
Fast on the heels of this article was the best-seller, Body Count: Moral 
Poverty . . . and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs, co-
authored by DiIulio, William Bennett, who headed the Office of Drug 
Policy under the first President Bush, and John Walters, who had been 
Bennett’s assistant and later became Executive Director of the Council on 
Crime in America.95  Expanding on the arguments DiIulio had made in the 
Weekly Standard, the authors warned that “America is now home to 
thickening ranks of juvenile ‘super-predators’—radically impulsive, 
brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who 
murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting 
gangs, and create communal disorders.”96 
To account for this new monster, DiIulio seized on what he called “a 
conservative theory of the root causes of crime”—that is, “moral 
poverty”:97   
Moral poverty is the poverty of being without loving, capable, responsible adults who 
teach you right from wrong.  It is the poverty of being without parents and other 
authorities who habituate you to feel joy at others’ joy, pain at others’ pain, happiness 
when you do right, and remorse when you do wrong.  It is the poverty of growing up 
in the virtual absence of people who teach morality by their own everyday example 
and who insist that you follow suit.98 
Violent juvenile crime, in other words, had nothing to do with the 
ready availability of guns or crack cocaine.  It had nothing to do with the 
collapse of inner-city infrastructures, economies, or support services.  
Society bore no responsibility for creating the social conditions that 
contributed to the breakdown of families, including the ravages caused by 
the War on Drugs.  In fact, violent juvenile crime had nothing to do with 
anything for which society could conceivably be responsible.  It was simply 
 
94 Id. 
95 WILLIAM BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO JR., & JOHN WALTERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL 
POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST POVERTY AND DRUGS (1996). 
96 Id. at 27. 
97 DiIulio, supra note 90. 
98 Id. 
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a matter of personal moral failure.  Children “are most likely to become 
criminally depraved when they are morally deprived.”99 
Though widely attacked by other scholars, the idea of the super-
predator proved irresistible to the popular and political imagination.  
Politicians and pundits enthusiastically embraced the idea that violent crime 
was caused by the offender’s moral poverty and not society’s amoral 
indifference or immoral neglect.  Yet if it was their fault, it was nonetheless 
our crisis.  The problem was foisted upon a blameless society, which now 
could only hope to manage and control it.  And it was “a monster of a 
problem,” the Washington Times warned. 100  “The super-predator is upon 
us.  The super-predator is a boy, a preteen and teen, who murders, rapes, 
robs, assaults, does and deals in deadly drugs, joins gangs with guns, 
terrorizes neighborhoods and sees no relationship between right and 
wrong . . . .  These boys are not so much demoralized as unmoralized.”101  
They are “far more dangerous” than ‘normal’ criminals.”102  In fact, they 
“may be the biggest, baddest generation of criminals any society has ever 
known.”103  The media wrung its hands in apocalyptic worry.  A TIME 
headline predicted “[a] [t]eenage [t]imebomb,”104 and U.S. News and World 
Report fretted that “it may take an even greater bloodbath to force effective 
crime solutions to the top of the nation’s agenda.”105  “The tsunami is 
coming,” Susan Estrich wrote in a 1996 column for USA Today.  “Juvenile 
crime is going up and getting worse.”106 
Simply in the nature of things, a crisis imagined as worse than all that 
came before it will induce a skepticism about existing solutions—haven’t 
 
99 Id. 
100 Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23. 
101 Id.; see also, e.g., Sharon Mack, The Age of the Super Predator: Mainers Say Soaring 
Juvenile Crime Portends Need for System Overhaul, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Maine), Apr. 24, 
1996 (“The Super Predator, Portland Police Chief Mike Chitwood explains, is a male, 14 to 
17 years old, with no remorse and no fear.  He is young and heartless and has no sense of the 
future.”); Warren Richey, Teen Crime Trend Puts Them Behind Adult Bars, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, June 2, 1997, at 4 (“America is being threatened by a growing cadre of cold-
blooded teens called ‘superpredators.’”).  
102 Editorial, The Psychological Side of Lawlessness and the Central Role of 
Incarceration, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 5, 1997, at 6. 
103 Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, 
at A17. 
104 Richard Zogling, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Timebomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, 
at 52. 
105 Ted Gest & Victoria Pope, Crime Time Bomb, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 
1996, at 28. 
106 STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE MORAL PANIC 
OVER THE CITY 109 (2006). 
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they already failed?—and a corresponding call for radical remedies.107  So it 
was with the super-predator.  As one Chicago prosecutor put it, the juvenile 
code “was written at a time when kids were knocking over outhouses, not 
killing people.  We’re looking at a whole new breed here.”  The sentiment 
was widespread.  A Brooklyn D.A. said the juvenile laws “were written at a 
time when kids were throwing spitballs . . . .  Now they’re committing 
murders.”  And the chief prosecutor in San Diego lamented, “Our juvenile 
justice system was created at a time of more ‘Leave it to Beaver’ type 
crimes, less sophisticated and not incredibly violent.  But what we see 
now . . . is kids who are real predators.”108 
In this way, the image of the super-predator—a tidal wave that could 
not be stopped but might be controlled—triggered a call for tougher 
juvenile laws, to which states responded with gusto.  What changed in this 
call was not the offender, but how society viewed and responded to him.  In 
keeping with the new penology, statutes “that had stressed ‘rehabilitation’ 
and ‘the best interests of the child’ were rewritten to emphasize 
‘punishment’ and ‘the protection of the public.’”109  At the same time, the 
American fondness for policy-by-sound-bite produced the catchy phrase, 
“adult time for adult crime.” 110  Between 1990 and 1996, forty states 
amended their laws to allow more children to be prosecuted as adults.  
Between 1996 and 1999, forty-three states relaxed their transfer laws, most 
acting for the second time in only a few years.111  In 1998 alone, 200,000 
 
107 Alas, it is ever thus, as the sociologist Edward Shils observed during the McCarthy 
era: 
In the United States the rule of law is deeply rooted in the interests of institutions and in a 
powerful tradition.  Alongside of it, however, runs a current of thought and sentiment, a 
disposition towards ideological enthusiasm and political passions, which proclaim great crises 
and announce their disbelief in the capacities of ordinary institutions and their leaders to resolve 
them. 
EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 161 (Arcturus Books 1974) (1956). 
108 The three preceding quotes are taken from David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, 
Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile 
Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 641 (2001).  Of course, the halcyon days of 
spitballs and outhouses never existed.  A close study of the juvenile code in Chicago, for 
instance, shows it was written with an eye to all manner of juvenile delinquent, and that early 
twentieth-century legislators were no more indifferent to the risk of violent juvenile crime 
than we are today.  Id. at 648–49. 
109 Id. at 642 (quoting MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 30 (1997)). 
110 See, e.g., Scott M. Fincher, Juvenile Crime Law Signed, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1996, at 
M3 (“Legislation requiring ‘adult time’ for ‘adult crime’ was signed into law Tuesday.”); Joe 
Davidson, Clinton, Dole Getting Tough on Violent Juvenile Crime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 
1996, at A16 (describing Dole’s campaign against juvenile delinquency). 
111 Id. at 643. 
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children were prosecuted as adults in the United States.112  Defending this 
trend, Florida Congressman Bill McCollum, when asked whether it was 
really necessary for a federal law that would have allowed thirteen-year-
olds to be prosecuted as adults, insisted, “They’re the predators out there.  
They’re not children anymore.  They’re the most violent criminals on the 
face of the earth.”113 
Of course, the super-predator was a myth.  The predicted explosion in 
juvenile crime never materialized.  By the time DiIulio coined the term, 
juvenile crime rates had already begun to fall, and continued to decline 
every year from 1994 to 2004.  After two years of modest increases in 
violent juvenile crime in 2005 and 2006, rates again began to fall and the 
most recent data, published by the Department of Justice in December 
2009, places juvenile violent crime rates at lower levels than at any point 
throughout the 1990s.114  And as crime rates fell, the super-predator theory 
seemed increasingly far-fetched.  In 2001, the Surgeon General issued a 
massive report on juvenile violence that exhaustively surveyed the available 
evidence.115  Addressing themselves to the idea of the super-predator, the 
authors concluded “there is no evidence that the young people involved in 
 
112 Id. (citing AMNESTY INT’L, BETRAYING THE YOUNG: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE US JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/060/1998).  
113 Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast June 25, 1996). 
114 CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 3 (2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf.  There were, of course, variations within offense categories, and 
rates for robbery showed a significant increase. 
The number of juvenile arrests in 2008 for forcible rape was less than in any year since at least 
1980, and the number of juvenile aggravated assault arrests in 2008 was less than in any year 
since 1988.  In contrast, after also falling to a relatively low level in 2004, juvenile arrests for 
murder increased each year from 2005 to 2007, then declined 5% in 2008.  However, juvenile 
arrests for robbery increased more than 46% since 2004. 
Id. at 4.  Still, overall arrest rates for juveniles have fallen significantly, and with the 
exception of robbery, from 1999 to 2008 rates for juveniles fell even more than the rates for 
adults in every category of violent or serious offense.  Id.  For discussions and debunking of 
the super-predator myth, see, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 3–16 
(1998); Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the 
Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (2000); Mark Soler 
et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483 
(2009); Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality?, 33 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 727 (1998). 
115 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ 
youthviolence/toc.html. 
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violence during the peak years of the early 1990s were more frequent or 
more vicious offenders than youth in earlier years.”116 
Meanwhile, scholars who promoted the idea of the super-predator 
admitted their mistake and expressed their regrets.  DiIulio, for instance, 
while praying at Mass on Palm Sunday in 1996, experienced an 
“epiphany—a conversion of heart, a conversion of mind.”117  In a flash, he 
said he suddenly understood that the solution for juvenile crime was 
treatment and prevention rather than incarceration and control.  “God had 
given me a Rolodex, good will and a passion that was sometimes 
misdirected,” he said, “and I knew that for the rest of my life I would work 
on prevention, on helping bring caring, responsible adults to wrap their 
arms around these kids.”118  In a commentary for the Wall Street Journal, 
he complained of “Washington’s dangerously deluded dogmas about 
crime . . . including the belief that most juvenile criminals are violent 
‘super-predators’ who can be stopped by the threat of long, hard prison 
terms.”119  And when asked about his theory, all he could say was, “[t]hank 
God we were wrong.”120 
* * * * 
The juvenile super-predator has gradually disappeared from the public 
imagination.  Yet he left an indelible mark, and not simply in the legal 
damage he caused—statutory and jurisprudential wreckage that has endured 
long after the ostensible justification has passed.  The more important effect 
of the super-predator fiasco was to reinforce the contemporary habit of the 
American mind, the distinctive way of creating, understanding, and 
responding to a perceived crisis of deviance and risk.121  And so it was that 
when one beast vanished and another reappeared, society “knew” what 
must be done.  Like the marauding teen, the serial sexual predator is a 
monster beyond comprehension or reform.  “Chronic sexual predators have 
 
116 Id. at 5.  The authors said the rise in juvenile violence “resulted primarily from a 
relatively sudden change in the social environment—the introduction of guns into violent 
exchanges among youths.  The violence epidemic was, in essence, the result of a change in 
the presence and type of weapon used, which increased the lethality of violent incidents.”  
Id. at 44. 
117 Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19. 
118 Id. 
119 John J. DiIulio Jr., Jail Alone Won’t Stop Juvenile Super-Predators, WALL ST. J., June 
11, 1997, at A23. 
120 Becker, supra note 117. 
121 Though he wrote about the new penology in the context of racial profiling, I believe 
William Rose meant the same thing when he referred to “a new way of talking about 
danger.”  See William Rose, Crimes of Color: Risk, Profiling, and the Contemporary 
Racialization of Social Control, 16 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 179, 185 (2002). 
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crossed an osmotic membrane,” one prolific commentator about the matter 
has observed; “They can’t step back to the other side—our side.  And they 
don’t want to . . . .  [W]e have but one choice.  Call them monsters and 
isolate them.”122 
Like the juvenile super-predator, the sexual predator is imagined as 
trapped in a pre-socialized state.  His emotional and psychological 
development is permanently stunted, frozen at a time that leaves him 
forever dedicated to his own personal gratification.  He cannot be 
rehabilitated because he “cannot return to a state that never existed.”123  
And he cannot be cured, because he is not sick.  He is simply evil, and 
society must not confuse one with the other.124  “When it comes to the 
sexual sadist, psychiatric diagnoses won’t protect us.  Appeasement 
endangers us.  Rehabilitation is a joke.”  The only safe solution is long-term 
incarceration; “no-parole life sentences for certain sex crimes . . . offer our 
only hope against an epidemic of sexual violence that threatens to pollute 
our society beyond the possibility of its own rehabilitation.”125 
In an important respect, however, the sexual predator is even more 
dangerous than his juvenile counterpart.  While the juvenile super-predator 
was a new “breed” of criminal, a “feral, pre-social being,” at least in theory 
he could, like any wild beast, be captured and imprisoned.  But the sexual 
predator is more cunning, more devious, and therefore more difficult to 
monitor and control.126  He can look and act just like “us,” and can stalk the 
malls, the schoolyards, and, worst of all, the Internet with impunity, luring 
 
122 Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can’t Be Saved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at A15; see 
also John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. 
L. REV. 31 (2008). 
123 Vachss, supra note 122. 
124 Andrew Vachss, What We Must Do . . . to Protect Our Children, PARADE MAG., July 
14, 2002, at 5. 
125 Vachss, supra note 122; see also Andrew Vachss, How to Handle Sexual Predators, 
WORLD & I, Aug. 1993, available at http://vachss.com/av_dispatches/disp_9308_a.html 
(“There is an old saying about monsters that we ought to heed: You don’t know where 
they’re going, but you can always tell where they’ve been.  Once an offender has shown us 
he has clearly embarked on the predator’s bloody road, it is our responsibility to make that 
road a dead end.”). 
126 Consider, for instance, the remarks of Congressman McCollum in support of the 
Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996: “It is well recognized that sexual 
predators are remarkably clever and persistently transient.  The offenders are not confined 
within state lines, and neither should our efforts to keep track of them.”  Mona Lynch, 
Pedophiles and Cyber-predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, 
Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 529, 545 (2002) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H11130 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) 
(statement of Rep. Betsy McCollum)). 
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impressionable children and lonely women with a façade of normalcy.127  
The juvenile super-predator is a savage beast, dangerous but containable, 
but the sexual predator is a diabolical fiend, clever and elusive.128 
And this perceived difference has given the response to the sexual 
predator a characteristic form.  We treated the juvenile super-predator as an 
adult, but generally no worse—warehousing him in the same place and the 
same way.  But the sexual predator inspires a sense of disgust and 
depravity.129  We fear infection—that he will slip beyond the bounds of 
“them” and contaminate “us.”  He is imagined not simply as a monster, but 
as a deadly virus that must be permanently quarantined.  His presence must 
be announced, his location known, his movement recorded.  Speaking in 
support of the Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, for 
instance, Joe Biden, then a Democratic Senator from Delaware, said, “We 
now seek to build a system where all movements of sexually violent and 
child offenders can be tracked and we will go a long way toward the day 
when none of these predators will fall between the cracks.”130  A Louisiana 
version of the ubiquitous community notification statute required the 
released offender to mail details about his record to his neighbors.  In urban 
areas, this meant everyone within a three-block area.  In Oregon, as a 
condition of parole, an ex-convict was required to post a sign on his front 
door that read, “Dangerous Sex Offender—No Children Allowed.”131  In 
many other jurisdictions, he may not live within shouting distance of the 
parks, schools, and playgrounds where he habitually trolls for victims.132  
Instead, he must be isolated and contained, like a disease. 
As with the juvenile super-predator, the state and federal legislatures 
responded enthusiastically to the perceived crisis of sexual predators.  
Sentences for convicted sex offenders have increased dramatically.  
California passed a “one strike” law in 1994, which mandated a twenty-
five-year sentence, with a minimum of fifteen years to be served prior to 
parole eligibility, for certain types of sex offenses.133  It followed this in 
1996 with a law calling for non-voluntary chemical castration of child 
 
127 See, e.g., Andrew Vachss, If We Really Want to Keep Our Children Safe . . . , PARADE 
MAG., May 2, 1999, at 5 (“Predatory pedophiles are experts at camouflage.  Virtually all of 
their approaches to children are made under a benign guise—offering ‘friendship’ or 
‘understanding.’  For every child molester who leaps out of a van wearing a ski mask to grab 
a victim, there are thousands whose weapons are deception and guile.”). 
128 See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 78, at 189–214. 
129 Lynch, supra note 126, at 538–54. 
130 Id. at 553 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S3421 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Joseph Biden)). 
131 JENKINS, supra note 78, at 200. 
132 Id. at 200–01. 
133 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61 (West 2011). 
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molesters, which is mandatory after the second conviction and discretionary 
after the first, where discretion resides with the sentencing judge.134  A 
number of states followed suit and passed similar laws permitting chemical 
castration for some sex offenders.135  In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act, named for a child abducted in Minnesota in 1989.136  The 
law provided that federal money would be withheld from states that did not 
have sex offender registration systems in place.137  All states now have such 
systems.138  Two years later, Congress passed Megan’s Law, named for a 
child killed by a repeat sex offender in New Jersey.139  Megan’s Law 
amended the Wetterling Act to require that states also establish a 
community notification system.140  Though these approaches vary 
somewhat from state to state, they all require that sex offenders provide 
their whereabouts to law enforcement, and sometimes to the broader 
community.  Many of these statutes forbid sex offenders from living within 
a specified distance of places where children might gather, including parks, 
schools, malls, skating rinks, swimming pools, etc.141  And finally, a 
number of states and the federal government have passed legislation 
allowing for the continued confinement of certain sex offenders even after 
they complete their sentence.142 
Not surprisingly, the response to the sexual marauder has been no 
more grounded in reality than the earlier response to the juvenile super-
predator.  To begin with, and contrary to the image that haunts the popular 
imagination, the largest number of sex offenders—and the overwhelming 
majority of offenders who abuse children—are not strangers who leap from 
 
134 Id. § 645. 
135 See Lynch, supra note 126, at 536. 
136 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006). 
137 Id. § 14071(g)(2). 
138 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 35, at 2. 
139 Pam Lynchner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14072 (2006). 
140 Id. § 14071 (amended 1996).  
141 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (West 2009) (forbidding certain sex 
offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of schools, public parks, youth centers, or daycare 
facilities); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2010) (imposing residence restriction 
on sex offenders whose victims were under the age of eighteen); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
24B-23 (2010) (forbidding sex offenders from living within a “community safety zone”). 
142 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2003).  These provisions survived due 
process challenges.  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997).  In United States v. Comstock, the Court held that Congress had authority under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a federal version of this statute.  130 S. Ct. 1949, 
1954 (2010); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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behind the bushes or prowl on the Internet, but family members, friends, 
and acquaintances.143  Tracking strangers who move from state to state, or 
forcing sex offenders to announce their presence to the community, may 
make for good television but has very little to do with sound criminal 
justice policy.  In addition, and once again contrary to the accepted wisdom, 
the recidivism rates for sex offenders are actually quite low.  Most studies 
show that approximately 3–5% of sex offenders are rearrested for a new sex 
offense within three years of their release, and even fewer are 
reconvicted.144  And finally, the reliable prediction that a particular person 
will reoffend—the ostensible foundation for preventive detention regimes—
is simply beyond the expertise of modern science.  As one researcher 
recently put it, “clinical predictions of future dangerousness, including 
sexual recidivism, are notoriously subjective and prone to bias and are 
frequently wrong.”145  None of this seems to matter, however, and public 
thought continues to dwell on the monster believed to be in our midst. 
* * * * 
The response to both the juvenile super-predator and the sexual 
predator reveals a now-distinctive habit of mind.  The marauder prompts 
images of subhuman deviance and apocalyptic risk.  A blameless society 
faces imminent destruction and demands immediate protection.  Politicians 
respond with the tools that have become most familiar—punishment and 
control.  And the pattern described for these particular beasts is merely 
representative.  The overlapping response to the “epidemics” of drugs146 
and gang violence147 has been much the same.  Together, they illustrate 
 
143 See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENSE LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY xvi–vii (2011).  According to the 2004 National Crime Victimization 
Survey, compiled by the Department of Justice, approximately a quarter of rapes and sexual 
assaults against adult women were committed by strangers.  For children, “strangers were 
the perpetrators in only 3.0 percent of the cases involving girls 0 to 5 years old, 4.8 percent 
of those involving girls 6 to 11, 10 percent of those involving girls 12 to 17, 3.5 percent of 
those involving boys 0 to 5, 4.6 percent of those involving boys 6 to 11, and 7.6 percent of 
those involving boys 12 to 17.”  Id. at xvii. 
144 Id. at 33–35.  
145 Id. at 35–36. 
146 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 824 (2002) (upholding suspicionless, warrantless drug testing of all students 
engaged in competitive extracurricular activities based in part on “the nationwide epidemic 
of drug use”); Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use 
in American Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425 (1994); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, 
Crack in Context: Politics and the Media in the Making of a Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP. 
DRUG PROBS. 535 (1989). 
147 See, e.g., Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, 
Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 
540 (1997) (“The term ‘gang banger’ invokes an image of violent young black men who are 
involved in activities such as drug dealing and prostitution.”); Erik Luna, The Models of 
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how contemporary American society has come to understand deviance and 
what it now demands in order to eliminate all risk.148 
IV. THE PUNITIVE TURN IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The punitive turn in American life has been greatly facilitated by a 
parallel shift in the law of criminal procedure.  Over the past several 
decades, the Supreme Court has steadily reoriented the doctrine to favor 
conservative approaches to deviance and risk.149  At the risk of 
oversimplification, one can imagine criminal procedure operating at two 
poles.  At one pole, criminal procedure can be conceived as the deliberate 
imposition of state power into the lives of those present within the 
community, either by surveillance, arrest, prosecution, or other forms of 
social control.  But the people who may suffer from this imposition of state 
power are not only part of the community, they are presumptively innocent, 
and therefore presumptively free to go about their affairs.  Because the 
exercise of state power has the inherent potential for oppression and 
arbitrariness, to the detriment of these rights, it must be cabined.  At the 
other pole, it is also possible to conceive of criminal procedure as a 
protection against lawlessness.  It exists as an essential prerogative of the 
state—viz., the power to make and enforce those rules which are necessary 
to maintain order and protect the public from the threat represented by 
criminals, who have shown by their conduct to be outside the community 
entitled to the state’s protection.  It adopts a distinctly adversarial stance 
toward the criminal element, with no pretense that they are “like us.”150 
 
Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 391 (1999) (discussing Chicago’s gang 
loitering ordinance to illustrate the tendency of criminal procedure doctrine to “heed the 
apocalyptic call and disregard the bedrock precedents of the past to suppress the alleged 
crisis of the present”). 
148 Indeed, at a more general level, the punitive response is not confined to criminology.  
Daniel Rodgers has recently shown how the steps leading up to the Welfare Reform Act of 
1996 followed much the same pattern: the demonization of the poor, who were exclusively 
to blame for their poverty, and who must be punished by removing the incentives in welfare 
which encourage them to remain impoverished.  See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 
201–09 (2011). 
149 See, e.g., Louis Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the Conservative Reformation, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1347 (2006) (“Social, cultural, political, and legal forces called for a 
conservative redirection in criminal justice.  The Court heeded the call.”). 
150 This model is akin to Herbert Packer’s vision of criminal procedure as the contest 
between due process and crime control.  See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION (1968).  There is a distinct sense in which Packer’s model is not useful to the new 
penology, since he clearly anticipated that the criminal process would be used to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish wrongdoers for past crimes rather than to prevent the commission of 
future crimes.  See id.; see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal 
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983). 
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It should be immediately apparent that these two conceptions will lead 
to dramatically different legal regimes.  In the former, an aggressive 
constabulary is seen as the potential source of totalitarian abuse; in the 
latter, it is the obvious answer to social chaos.  In one, law enforcement is a 
problem to be restrained; in the other, it is a solution to be unleashed.  And 
in the past fifty years, the unmistakable trend in the doctrine has been to 
favor the second vision over the first.  Notwithstanding occasional outliers 
like Florida v. J.L.151 or Kyllo v. United States,152 the Court has proven 
remarkably willing to accommodate, and advance, the punitive turn in 
American culture.  Since the late 1960s, the Court has steadily expanded the 
power of the government to monitor, stop, arrest, interrogate, and imprison 
people suspected of criminal behavior, to keep them there for extended 
periods, and to continue their detention indefinitely, even after their 
sentences have ended.153 
These developments have been the subject of endless commentary, 
which I do not repeat here.154  My discussion assumes a basic familiarity 
with the doctrine and focuses instead on the close relationship between the 
developing jurisprudence and the broader cultural preference for the 
punitive turn.155  Though it is dangerous to reduce this entire trend to a 
 
151 529 U.S. 266, 266 (2000) (finding that police may not stop and frisk a person “solely 
from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller” that “a young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun”).  Still, the 
Court left open the possibility that a different tip involving a greater risk of harm—perhaps 
that a Muslim-looking woman was at a bus stop wearing a burqa and carrying a bomb—
might be enough.  Id. at 273–74. 
152 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001) (“[T]he use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private 
home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
153 For an argument that cases like Kyllo and J.L. were not outliers but rather a part of a 
countertrend against the “conservative reformation” of the ‘80s and ‘90s, see Louis D. 
Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of Reading Criminal 
Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1032 (2005).  From the perspective of 
five additional years, Dean Bilionis’s prediction seems to have been premature. 
154 For a discussion of the literature, see Arenella, supra note 150, at 185–97.  Much of 
this literature contrasts the Warren Court with the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and 
concludes the former was not as radically liberal, and the latter not as radically conservative, 
as they are often portrayed.  See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was it Really so 
Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is it Really so Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police 
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 
62, 62–91 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).  My interest is in the overall trend of the doctrine and its 
accommodation of the punitive turn rather than a comparison of one Court to another. 
155 For a discussion of how the law shapes the popular imagination by conferring 
legitimacy on cultural trends, see, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3 (1991) (“This legalization of popular culture is 
both cause and consequence of our increasing tendency to look to law as an expression of the 
few values that are widely shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice 
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single sentiment, I suggest it represents the triumph of the view expressed 
by then-Justice Rehnquist in Illinois v. Gates, the 1984 decision which 
replaced the Aguilar–Spinelli two-pronged test for probable cause based on 
an informant’s tip with a more flexible and deferential inquiry into “the 
totality of the circumstances.”156  By itself, the decision is simply part of the 
overall trend, vesting more authority in local law enforcement and imposing 
corresponding limits on both the magistrate who is asked to issue a warrant 
and the judge who is called to review it.157  But far more important was 
Justice Rehnquist’s observation, apropos of nothing, that the Aguilar–
Spinelli test poorly served “the most basic function of any government,” 
which, he said, was “to provide for the security of the individual and of his 
property.”158 
This language, lifted from Justice White’s dissent in Miranda v. 
Arizona,159 reflects a dramatic shift in judicial thinking.  Certainly the view 
it expresses is not self-evident; one could just as easily say, for instance, 
that “the most basic function of any government” is to provide for the 
welfare of its members, or to guarantee the rights of its members, or to 
ensure the liberty of its members.  Any one of these formulations could 
provide for the security of individuals and their property but nonetheless 
lead to a set of rules that would tend to protect against the encroachments of 
law enforcement.  One could likewise say that “the most basic function of 
any government” is to promote a free and open society.  This too could 
provide for the security of individuals and their property but would again 
suggest a different and more limited role for the machinery of law 
enforcement.  Instead, Justice Rehnquist elevated security to a uniquely 
privileged status, which in turn leads to a set of rules that tend to permit and 
facilitate rather than cabin and restrain the state.  The point, of course, is not 
that one view is conclusively superior to another or that this orientation will 
 
under law . . . .  Legality, to a great extent, has become a touchstone for legitimacy.”); 
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964) (defining legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds 
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties 
and rights determined by rules”); Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 5, at 456–57. 
156 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983). 
157 Id. at 236. 
158 Id. at 237 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) 
(White, J. dissenting)). 
159 384 U.S. at 539 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White cited Lanzetta v. New Jersey 
where the Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a New Jersey statute which had 
criminalized membership in “a gang.”  306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939), (“The challenged 
provision condemns no act or omission; the terms it employs to indicate what it purports to 
denounce are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  The Court noted the statute had 
been construed by the state court, which, in dicta, wrote that “[t]he primary function of 
government . . . is to render security to its subjects.”  Id. at 455. 
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necessarily lead to a different result in every case, but simply that Justice 
Rehnquist’s view represents a striking victory for the punitive turn.160 
This victory has found expression throughout the doctrine.  For 
instance, the Court has steadily expanded the universe of allowable police 
investigation by shrinking the reach of the Fourth Amendment.  In Katz v. 
United States, the 1967 landmark decision, the Court struck down the 
warrantless electronic surveillance of a phone booth used by Katz for his 
interstate gambling.161  Katz was a structural decision that reflected a 
suspicion of law enforcement and a preference for judicial oversight in 
order to ensure a free and open society.  As the Court noted, the FBI agents 
in Katz acted with undeniable restraint: 
They did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner’s 
activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in 
question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States . . . .  Moreover, 
the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of 
establishing the contents of the petitioner’s unlawful telephonic communications.  The 
agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the 
telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the 
petitioner himself.162 
In addition, the agents relied on the prior Supreme Court decision in 
Olmstead v. United States, which held that electronic surveillance without 
trespass and without seizure of tangible property did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.163 
The Court in Katz was unmoved: 
[T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not 
by a judicial officer.  They were not required, before commencing the search, to 
present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.  
They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise 
limits established in advance by a specific court order.  Nor were they directed, after 
the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that 
had been seized.164 
To some, this no doubt seemed like a triumph of form over substance, 
the needless elevation of legal technicalities that frustrated the reasonable, 
good faith efforts of zealous and creative law enforcement.  To the Court in 
 
160 Compare 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124 (stating that the goal of 
society is “to protect individuals in the enjoyment of . . . rights . . . which could not be 
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the 
institution of friendly and social communities”).  I am grateful to my colleague Al Alschuler 
for bringing this to my attention. 
161 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
162 Id. at 354. 
163 Id. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928)). 
164 Id. at 356. 
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1967, however, it was simply adherence to the constitutional requirement 
“that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be 
interposed between the citizen and the police.”165 
Yet the test that emerged from Katz was articulated by Justice Harlan 
in concurrence: a search occurred only if the petitioner exhibited an 
expectation of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.166  The inherent subjectivity of this inquiry has allowed the 
Court to accommodate the punitive turn by gradually shrinking the area 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, the police may conduct a 
warrantless search of privately owned fields adjacent to one’s home even if 
the owner has taken special steps to prevent the public from trespassing 
unlawfully on the land.167  They may search structures close to the home 
but beyond the curtilage, even if the owner has taken elaborate precautions 
to ensure the privacy of those structures.168  They may search structures 
within the curtilage, even if they cannot be seen from the street, so long as 
they may be seen by a plane flying overhead.169  And they may search 
structures within the curtilage that cannot be seen from the street, and 
cannot be seen from a plane flying overhead, so long as they can be seen 
from a low-flying helicopter.170  They may not, however, ascertain the 
content of one’s home without a warrant unless they do so by the use of an 
officer’s unenhanced senses.171 
Just as the police have greater latitude to search, they have greater 
authority to arrest.  In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court held that 
police could make a custodial arrest for any offense, even one for which the 
maximum penalty did not include the possibility of incarceration.172  This, 
of course, entitles the police to conduct a warrantless search incident to the 
arrest173 and to conduct a warrantless inventory search of any impounded 
vehicle.174  A number of municipalities tried to limit Atwater by making it a 
violation of state law to arrest a person for a fine-only offense.  But in 
Virginia v. Moore, the Court held that an officer who violates such a law 
 
165 Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963). 
166 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
167 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175–77 (1984). 
168 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1987). 
169 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
170 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
171 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
172 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
173 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755–56 (1969). 
174 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976). 
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does not also violate the Fourth Amendment, which means a person may be 
arrested and jailed for a fine-only offense even if the arrest is illegal.175 
Though Atwater and Moore dramatically expanded the state’s power to 
arrest (and therefore to search), that authority was at least restrained by the 
requirement that the arrest be based on probable cause.  But of course, since 
Terry v. Ohio, the police have been allowed to stop and frisk a person based 
only on a lesser showing of reasonable suspicion.176  In Terry, the Court 
struggled to strike a workable balance between the interests of the state in 
effective law enforcement and the interest of the individual in personal 
liberty. 177  Ultimately, the Court held that an officer may stop a person if he 
can articulate something more than a bare hunch that criminal activity is 
afoot, and may frisk him if he has a reasonable concern for his safety.178  As 
with Katz, however, the Court in subsequent cases has given Terry an 
expansive reading.  Innocent explanations for “suspicious” behavior are 
waved off, and sinister explanations are accepted based on the ostensibly 
superior judgment of experienced police officers.179  This accounts for cases 
like Illinois v. Wardlow, where the Court held that running away at the sight 
of an officer in a high-crime neighborhood, without more, is grounds for a 
Terry stop.180  In addition, the Court has applied Terry in circumstances 
quite beyond its original justification, including, for instance, the seizure 
and intrusive search of foreign nationals at the border.181 
In much the same way, the protections extended to an accused during 
police interrogations have been gradually whittled away.  In Miranda v. 
Arizona, the Court held that a custodial interrogation had to be preceded by 
a set of warnings lest the interrogation run afoul of the privilege against 
self-incrimination.182  Since that decision, the Court has steadily narrowed 
its scope by: taking a crabbed reading of “custody” and “interrogation”;183 
 
175 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008).  Certainly, a state could limit Atwater by directing that 
a violation of state law required dismissal of the underlying offense, which could provide a 
remedy even in the absence of the Fourth Amendment.  The law in Moore, however, was not 
of this character.  See VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-74 (2004).   
176 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
177 See id. at 22–27. 
178 Id. at 27. 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A determination that 
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”); 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (finding reasonable suspicion based on 
decision of bystander to run from police in a high-crime neighborhood). 
180 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25. 
181 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985). 
182 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
183 See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–67 (2004) (age and experience 
with law enforcement should not be taken into account to determine when a person is 
considered in custody); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (questions asked by an 
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ruling that it does not prohibit most forms of police trickery;184 and holding 
that it does not apply either to impeachment or to questioning that protects 
“public safety.”185  And in United States v. Patane, a plurality found that a 
Miranda violation does not prevent the admission of subsequently-seized 
physical evidence located as a product of the unlawful statement.186  It is 
not for nothing that the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, when he upheld 
Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, was able to ignore his long-standing 
criticism of the 1966 landmark decision with the jaunty but accurate 
assessment that intervening cases had substantially lessened its impact.187  
Far better, therefore, to leave the case as a symbol of American 
commitment to due process even though it has been all but stripped of its 
potency.188 
Just as the Court has gradually made it easier for the police to stop, 
frisk, arrest, search, and interrogate, they have also made it easier for 
prosecutors to convict.  For instance, even when a search is conducted 
without a warrant, the many exceptions to the Warrant Clause—hot 
pursuit,189 plain view,190 automobiles,191 checkpoints,192 “special needs,”193 
 
undercover officer posing as a cellmate do not constitute an interrogation sufficient to trigger 
Miranda); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301–02 (1980) (a conversation between 
officers in earshot of a suspect does not constitute an interrogation because “police surely 
cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions”); Oregon 
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494–95 (1977) (no Miranda warnings are required when a 
suspect is told he is not under arrest). 
184 E.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738–39 (1969) (an officer’s false statement about 
evidence against a suspect did not render his subsequent confession coerced). 
185 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (“[T]here is a ‘public safety’ 
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers 
may be admitted into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not depend upon 
the motivation of the individual officers involved.”); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 
(1971) (holding that Miranda does not bar the use of coerced statements for impeachment 
purposes, so long as those statements are deemed trustworthy). 
186 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004). 
187 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
188 Id. at 444. 
189 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (“The Fourth Amendment does not 
require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely 
endanger their lives or the lives of others.”). 
190 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) (holding that if lawfully present, 
police may seize evidence in plain view, without a warrant, if incriminating character is 
immediately apparent). 
191 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 153 (1925). 
192 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (explaining that checkpoint stops do not 
require individualized suspicion in order to pass constitutional muster); Mich. Dep’t State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that the state’s interest in preventing drunk 
driving outweighs intrusion upon an individual motorist who is stopped at checkpoint). 
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exigent circumstances,194 border crossings,195 inventory searches,196 etc.—
make it a good bet the search will be upheld.  And even if it is not, the 
increasing resistance to the exclusionary rule means the evidence is not 
likely to be suppressed.197  In the same spirit, the Court has held that 
remarkably punitive sentences do not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.198  To be sure, the Court in 
Graham v. Florida recently put at least some limit on these developments, 
but one should recall the question presented in Graham—viz., whether, 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment, a juvenile who did not kill may 
nonetheless be sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison without the 
 
193 Bd. of Educ. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825, 
835 (2002) (upholding warrantless drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular 
activities, regardless of whether there was a history of a serious drug problem in the school); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649, 657, 664–65 (1995) (upholding 
suspicionless and warrantless drug testing of student athletes because such students had 
decreased expectation of privacy, the search was unobtrusive, and drugs were a problem at 
the school). 
194 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers 
may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant 
or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 
(1984) (“[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency 
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.”). 
195 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (law enforcement may, 
without a warrant, “remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank” when that 
search occurs at the border); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) 
(“[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to 
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are 
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”). 
196 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (“Even if less intrusive means existed 
of protecting some particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police 
officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding 
which containers or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.”); South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) (“[I]nventories pursuant to standard police 
procedures are reasonable.”). 
197 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (when police error, though 
unconstitutional, is “isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,” no exclusion is 
required); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (no exclusion if police can 
show independent source); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (no exclusion if 
police acted in good faith); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (no exclusion if 
police can establish inevitable discovery). 
198 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (no constitutional 
objection to sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for possession of 
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–71, 374–75 (1982) (no constitutional problem 
in forty-year sentence and $20,000 fine for possession and distribution of nine ounces of 
marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 285 (1980) (no constitutional problem 
with sentence of life in prison for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses under the “three 
strikes” law). 
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possibility of parole.199  The mere fact that the question arose shows the 
extent to which the punitive turn has taken hold in American sentencing. 
And finally, the Court has approved at least some preventive detention 
regimes.  In United States v. Salerno, for instance, the Court upheld the Bail 
Reform Act, which authorizes preventive detention prior to trial.200  In 
Kansas v. Hendricks201 and Kansas v. Crane,202 the Court upheld a statute 
authorizing indefinite, involuntary detention of sex offenders who have 
completed their sentences but continue to find it difficult to control their 
sexual impulses.  And in United States v. Comstock, the Court held that 
Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a 
federal version of this statute.203 
In the final analysis, criminal procedure doctrine illustrates quite well 
the continuing cross-pollination between law and culture.  As American 
thought has taken a punitive turn, the doctrine has steadily accommodated 
the growing clamor for public safety.  And as the Court has repeatedly 
justified its doctrinal shifts by emphasizing the need for public safety, it has 
helped to create the very cultural demand it seeks to satisfy.  The result is a 
kind of dialectic, where increased demand for punitive sanctions is used to 
justify changes in the doctrine, and changes in the doctrine create space for 
increasingly punitive sanctions.  It is not a one-way ratchet, of course, and 
matters do not spiral endlessly toward only one outcome, but for the last 
forty years they have certainly moved in one direction far more easily than 
the other. 
 
199 30 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010). 
200 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
201 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
202 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
203 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (applying U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).  It would 
certainly be a mistake to suggest that cases like Salerno and Hendricks resolve the present 
debate over preventive detention.  In Salerno, for instance, the indicted defendant faced the 
prospect of an imminent prosecution, which mitigated the impact of the statute and 
eliminated the risk of indefinite detention without legal process.  See 481 U.S. at 747.  And 
in Hendricks and Crane, the statute under review applied to prisoners who had already been 
convicted of a sexual assault and who, because of a diagnosed condition, found it difficult to 
control their conduct.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 410; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352.  The call for 
preventive detention of suspected terrorists, however, takes these developments a step 
further.  Today, the suggestion is advanced that detention could be based solely on 
predictions about future dangerousness, and for which past conduct and the petitioner’s 
mental state may be relevant but are not essential to the Government’s case.  In this sense, 
the call for preventive detention of suspected terrorists is really a demand for anticipatory 
detention—detention purely in anticipation of what the person may do, without regard to 
what he may have done in the past, and without regard to his ability to restrain himself. 
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V. PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
The foregoing, which provides a snapshot of the punitive turn in 
American thought, is meant to capture the American state of mind—at least 
with respect to deviance and risk—when the planes struck the buildings. 
A. THE TERRORIST AS SUPER-PREDATOR 
Within days of the attacks of 9/11, an image of the Islamic terrorist 
began to emerge that was built from the same rhetorical resources that 
Americans have successfully employed for the past several decades to 
construct a never-ending series of super-predators.  The terrorists, like any 
predator, were inherently malevolent.  The “attacks of September 11,” John 
Ashcroft told the House Committee on the Judiciary, “drew a bright line of 
demarcation between the civil and the savage.”204  There is no 
understanding them, for they are simply evil.  “We are in a conflict between 
good and evil,” President Bush said, “and America will call evil by its 
name.”205  More beast than man, terrorists live on the “hunted margin”206 of 
mankind and have rejected “those values that separate us from animals—
compassion, tolerance, mercy.”207  They are “parasites,”208 a “scourge,”209 
an “evil and inhuman group of men,”210 who spread their “cancer,”211 their 
“spawn,”212 throughout the civilized world. 
Sadly, this was not simply the language of politicians or the right.  In 
2002, Alan Dershowitz published Why Terrorism Works.213  Terrorism 
works, he wrote, “because its perpetrators believe that by murdering 
innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world 
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to their perceived grievances.”214  Since that is what terrorists want, society 
must not give it to them: We must commit ourselves never to try to 
understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it 
beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation.”215  These are not people with 
whom you can negotiate.  Instead,  
they are like cunning beasts of prey: we cannot reason with them, but we can—if we 
work at it—outsmart them, set traps for them, cage them, or kill them.  The difference 
is, of course, that they are much smarter than the most cunning of beasts.  Indeed, we 
must operate on the assumption that they are as smart as we are, but more determined, 
more single-minded, more ruthless, and less constrained by morality, decency, and 
legality.216   
In a few short sentences, Dershowitz adopts the tropes of the criminal as 
superhuman predator—less than human, but so much more dangerous. 
This rhetoric became somewhat more concrete, if no less hyperbolic, 
once it could be directed at actual people.  When the first prisoners arrived 
at Guantanamo, senior Administration officials promptly described them as 
“among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of the 
earth.”217  They were “the worst of a very bad lot,”218 and “very dangerous 
people,” who “would gnaw hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it 
down.”219  Hyperbolic foolishness like this has proven remarkably durable.  
“Those men who are at Gitmo are the meanest, nastiest killers in the 
world,” fulminated Republican Congressman Chris Chambliss of Georgia 
in 2009, speaking in opposition to the President’s plan to close 
Guantanamo.220  “Every single one of them wakes up every day thinking of 
ways they can kill and harm Americans, both our soldiers as well as 
individuals.”221  Representative Chambliss did not trifle himself with the 
fact that the Obama Administration has cleared the majority of prisoners at 
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the base for release.222  Like any ideology, these beliefs are fast becoming 
impervious to fact. 
Of course, the essential counterpoint to evil is innocence.  Just as post-
9/11 rhetoric described the terrorist in the familiar language of the modern 
criminal super-predator, it invoked the innocence of American society to 
fend off any heretical suggestion that U.S. foreign policy could have 
contributed, even remotely, to the attacks.  In his first address to Congress 
after the attacks, President Bush famously pronounced the answer to the 
question, “Why?”  “They hate what they see right here in this Chamber, a 
democratically elected government . . . .  They hate our freedoms, our 
freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and 
assemble and disagree with each other.”223  “They can’t stand what America 
stands for,” he said later.224  “It must bother them greatly to know we’re 
such a free and wonderful place—a place where all religions can flourish; a 
place where women are free; a place where children can be educated.  It 
must grate on them greatly.”225  And on the day of the attacks, Bush said, 
“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world.”226 
This rhetoric has been exhaustively critiqued.  In particular, the social 
construction of the evil Islamic terrorist and innocent American victim has 
been thoroughly reprised in the post-9/11 literature, and need not be 
repeated here.227  Typically, this literature suggests that the image of the 
terrorist draws its rhetorical inspiration solely from the demonization of 
prior wartime enemies.  As Richard Jackson put it: 
At its most basic level, the discursive construction of the depersonalized and 
dehumanized ‘enemy other’ can be seen in the commonly used derogatory terms that 
soldiers of every generation have employed.  ‘Hun’, ‘Japs’, ‘gooks’, ‘rag-heads’ and 
‘skinnies’ are the means by which fellow human beings—who are also husbands, 
sons, brothers, friends—are discursively transformed into a hateful and loathsome 
‘other’ who can be killed and abused without remorse or regret.  The term ‘terrorist’ is 
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simply the latest manifestation of this discursive process—today’s ‘terrorists’ are the 
new ‘gooks.’228 
But this analogy is doubly flawed: on the one hand, it ignores virtually 
all changes in American thought since the early 1970s, and on the other 
hand, it suggests that wartime demonization is sui generis, and entirely 
unrelated to the vilification of others that has marred so much of American 
history.  In these respects, the analogy is not so much mistaken as it is 
incomplete.  The latter of these flaws—the failure to recognize the 
connection between wartime and peacetime demonization—is beyond the 
scope of this Article.229  My concern is with the former—the failure to take 
account of recent changes in American thought. 
The 9/11 attackers were non-state actors who committed an enormous 
crime, and despite the great rhetorical effort to construct them as warriors—
despite, for instance, the attempt to denominate their conduct as an act of 
war—the fact is that the terrorist does not easily fit into the public image of 
an enemy soldier.  Quite simply, it takes a creative imagination to see al 
Qaeda as the same as the German, Japanese, Korean, or North Vietnamese 
armies.  What does it mean, therefore, to say, as Jackson does, that terrorists 
are “the new” “gooks” or “Japs” or “Huns”?  Americans cannot readily 
identify Islamic terrorists with Japanese or German soldiers, and for good 
reason—they are not remotely the same.  Nor does the “War on Terror” fit 
the popular understanding of war, as many have noted.  These differences 
are not inconsequential.  On the contrary, they are at the heart of the 
confusion in American post-9/11 policy—whether and to what extent “war” 
is a useful or even intelligible paradigm for the challenge of trans-national 
terrorism perpetrated by Islamic terrorists.  While policymakers spar over 
this question, Americans make sense of the Islamic terrorist by analogy to 
what he has been rhetorically constructed to be—viz., not some modern 
day enemy soldier, but as the latest, and by far the most dangerous iteration 
of a lurking, apocalyptic danger posed by a subhuman predator that 
threatens to overwhelm the American public, and for which the American 
public demands the prompt elimination of all risk. 
B. TERROR, RISK, AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Thus, the image of the terrorist was built from the same rhetorical 
resources that had previously been used to build the monster-criminal.  The 
new beast, even more than his predecessors, was imagined to create a risk 
of indescribable danger, and therefore demanded an even more 
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comprehensive response—a response even more likely to eliminate all risk.  
In that way, the cultural aversion to risk that dominates criminal justice 
policy has also come to dominate the debate over preventive detention.230  
The rhetoric reveals the same explosive, populist insistence that all risk be 
eliminated and all danger prevented.  Yet in key respects, the preventive 
detention debate is even more irrational, more hyperbolic, since partisans 
can invoke more than a merely metaphoric war on crime.  The cultural 
hostility to risk, already elevated in the new penology, is amplified still 
more by the notion that the country is at war, and that this beast is truly the 
worst of the worst.  It is in this explosive context that policymakers have 
been debating preventive detention. 
Though academics and journalists had been debating the merits of a 
post-9/11 preventive detention regime for years, the idea received its most 
prominent endorsement in May 2009 when President Obama, in his only 
major speech on national security, included it as an option for the road 
ahead.231  Speaking at the National Archives, and invoking the mythical 
power of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of 
Rights, Obama said the Bush Administration “went off course” when it 
made “a series of hasty decisions” that “established an ad hoc legal 
approach for fighting terrorism . . . that failed to rely on our legal traditions 
and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a 
compass.”232  To correct these mistakes, Obama said he had made 
“dramatic changes” that represented “a new direction from the last eight 
years,” and that his approach to terrorism, unlike that of his predecessor, 
was faithful to “our most fundamental values. . . [to] liberty and justice in 
this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, fairness, 
equality, and dignity around the world.”233  These changes, he vowed, 
would allow us to resume our timeless “American journey . . . ‘to form a 
more perfect union.’”234 
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Obama’s speech left a powerful impression that his Administration had 
reclaimed America’s moral standing, ending the abuses of a shameful past 
and returning to our foundational principles.235  Lost in the comforting 
rhetoric, however, were the policy details, which included—for the first 
time in U.S. history—support for a preventive detention regime.  In 
outlining how his administration would deal with the prisoners at 
Guantanamo, Obama divided them into five categories: those who would be 
prosecuted in federal court, those who would be prosecuted before military 
commissions, those who would be released to their home countries, those 
who would be repatriated to another country, and those who would be 
preventively detained.236  With respect to the fifth category, he said: 
Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be 
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people.  And I have to be 
honest here—this is the toughest single issue that we will face.  We’re going to 
exhaust every avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a 
danger to our country.  But even when this process is complete, there may be a 
number of people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because 
evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the 
United States. . . .  Let me repeat: I am not going to release individuals who endanger 
the American people.237 
In that way, the idea that depriving a person of his liberty—perhaps for 
the rest of his life—not because of what he may have done, but because of 
what he may yet do, and simply to avoid the risk of an adverse outcome at 
trial, was smothered in the reassuring twaddle about American “values.” 
This cultural aversion to risk resurfaced late in 2009, when Attorney 
General Holder announced that the alleged 9/11 conspirators held at 
Guantanamo would be prosecuted in federal court.  The announcement 
touched off an intense backlash on the political right that was awash in the 
tropes of war and risk.  The Wall Street Journal said Holder “has invited 
grave and needless security risks by tempting jihadists the world over to 
strike Manhattan while the trial is in session.”238  Charles Krauthammer 
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said the “trial will be a security nightmare and a terror threat to New 
York—what better propaganda-by-deed than blowing up the entire 
courtroom, making [Khalid Sheik Mohammed] a martyr and making the 
judge, jury and spectators into fresh victims?”239  Republican 
Representative Peter King of New York attacked the decision as “not only 
misguided but extremely dangerous,”240 and Representative Lamar Smith of 
Texas, the highest ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, 
accused the administration of placing “the rights of terrorists over the rights 
of Americans to be safe and secure.”241 
Human Events thought an attack on the trial itself was unlikely.  
“Smart terrorists—and it is critically important that we realize the degree of 
sophistication and cunning many of these men possess—are not going to 
attack the trial or prison in order to break the defendants out.”  Instead, they 
will target 
schools, hospitals, and churches that they will take down and hold hostage for release 
of their compatriots. . . . If you live in a town where school children are held hostage, 
raped and murdered, perhaps in Westchester Country, New Jersey, or Long Island, or 
another more remote location, ask yourself, are you . . . personally willing to accept 
the risk?242 
Many commentators also dwelt on the prospect that “one or more of these 
detainees could be acquitted, which would be a mockery of justice.”243  
“The possibility that Khalid Sheik Mohammed and his co-conspirators 
could be found ‘not guilty’ due to some legal technicality just blocks from 
Ground Zero should give every American pause,” House Republican leader 
John Boehner said.244 
Responding to this criticism, Holder adopted the unfortunate position 
of all but guaranteeing that the prisoners prosecuted in federal court would 
be duly convicted.  “I would not have authorized the prosecution of these 
cases,” he said, “unless I was confident that our outcome would be a 
successful one.”245  Whatever else the rule of law might imply, it certainly 
means the state ought not to be able to guarantee a particular outcome in 
advance.  Observers quickly seized on his language.  Charles Krauthammer, 
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for instance, mused, “Doesn’t the presumption of innocence, er, presume 
that prosecutorial failure—acquittal, hung jury—is an option?  By 
undermining that presumption, Holder is undermining the fairness of the 
trial, the demonstration of which is the alleged rationale for putting on this 
show in the first place.”246  This criticism was misdirected; every trial 
lawyer makes assessments about the probable outcome of an upcoming 
trial, and prosecutors often assess their likelihood of success as quite high.  
What is significant in Holder’s remark was not that he predicted success, 
but that all participants in the conversation shared the view that an acquittal 
would have completely de-legitimized the process.  The entire debate, in 
other words, assumed an unwillingness to countenance the risk of an 
adverse outcome.  No result could satisfy the punitive turn in American life 
unless the risk to society was zero.247 
All of this heated rhetoric about risk converged in the furor 
surrounding the outcome of the Ahmed Ghailani trial.  A federal grand jury 
in the Southern District of New York had indicted Ghailani for his alleged 
role in the 1998 al Qaeda bombings of the United States embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.248  The simultaneous 
explosions killed nearly three hundred people, including more than two 
hundred innocent civilians.249  After five days of deliberations, the jury 
acquitted Ghailani of all counts but one, convicting him of a single count of 
conspiracy to destroy government buildings and property.250 
Four of Ghailani’s co-conspirators had been captured shortly after the 
bombing.  They had been brought to New York by the FBI, where they 
were prosecuted in the Southern District, convicted, and sentenced to life in 
prison.251  Ghailani, by contrast, was arrested July 24, 2004 in Pakistan.252  
Rather than bring him to the United States to face prosecution, he was 
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detained and interrogated by the CIA at undisclosed “black sites” as part of 
the Bush Administration’s “enhanced interrogation program.”  In 
September 2006, the CIA relinquished custody of him and thirteen other so-
called high value detainees to the Department of Defense, which held them 
at Guantanamo.253  Ghailani was the first (and so far, the only) CIA and 
Guantanamo detainee to be tried in civilian court.254  Further complicating 
the issue was Judge Lewis Kaplan’s pretrial ruling that an important 
prosecution witness could not testify because the Government had learned 
the man’s identity through Ghailani’s concededly involuntary statements 
made during admittedly abusive interrogations.255 
The Ghailani verdict was immediately denounced in terms that 
resonate perfectly with the punitive turn.  Conservatives attacked the 
Obama Administration for its reckless decision to expose the country to the 
risk of an adverse outcome.  Republican Senator Mitch McConnell said he, 
“like most Americans, wondered why we would even take the chance” of 
trying Ghailani in a civilian court.256  Liz Cheney, the daughter of the 
former Vice President and member of the advocacy group, KEEP 
AMERICA SAFE, considered it inexcusable to be “roll[ing] the dice in a 
time of war.”257  And Jennifer Rubin, writing in Commentary Magazine, 
called the entire trial “part of a stunt by the Obama administration.”258  
Other commentators focused on the failure of the verdict to send an 
unambiguous signal of the community’s outrage, as though only a verdict in 
favor of the government on every count could possibly satisfy the blood-
lust of the American people.  Peter King, for instance, the incoming 
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Chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee, called the 
verdict, for which Ghailani will be sentenced to a minimum of twenty years 
and a maximum of life imprisonment, “a total miscarriage of justice.”259  
Cheney said it sent a dangerous signal of “weakness in a time of war.”260 
To be sure, some writers quite properly pointed out that the function of 
a trial is “to guarantee fairness, not convictions.”261  Writing in the New 
Yorker, for instance, Amy Davidson said, “[o]ur legal system is not a 
machine for producing the maximum number of convictions, regardless of 
the law.”262  Others ventured that we had only ourselves to blame for the 
Ghailani verdict.  Focusing on the impact of Judge Kaplan’s pretrial ruling, 
the Center for Constitutional Rights said, “If anyone is unsatisfied with 
Ghailani’s acquittal on 284 counts, they should blame the CIA agents who 
tortured him.”263  And some criticized the previous administration for 
mishandling the case at an earlier stage.264  But these voices were largely 
drowned out by a chorus of condemnation, an angry indignation that 
Obama had “rolled the dice,”265 and that Ghailani would not get his just 
desserts. 
More importantly, however, is the outcome that dared not speak its 
name: that Ghailani could have been given a fair trial, and if acquitted, 
released and repatriated.  The very prospect left conservatives quaking with 
rage and liberals shaking in fear.  Even Judge Kaplan, in his order granting 
the defense motion in limine to prevent the testimony of the key 
prosecution witness, reassured himself and the public that, if Ghailani were 
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press-releases/center-constitutional-rights-responds-ghailani-verdict. 
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http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/11/hbc-90007816.  Horton also pointed out that 
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to be acquitted as a result of his ruling, he could still be held as an enemy 
combatant at Guantanamo.266  The prospect that the United States would 
have to endure the risk that even a single alleged terrorist would be released 
proved too much for American culture to contemplate.267 
And in this climate, calls for preventive detention have predictably 
resurfaced.  Why take any risk?  Why expose the country’s legal system to 
the calumny it endured after the Ghailani verdict?  Why incur the cost and 
effort?  Far better that Ghailani and others at Guantanamo simply be 
detained, without regard to what they may have done, or what the 
government can prove they have done, in the past.  So argue Jack 
Goldsmith and Ben Wittes, longtime champions of preventive detention, 
who declare that in light of the verdict, preventive detention “now makes 
more sense than trial in any forum for a dwindling group of Guantanamo 
detainees whose prosecutions are more trouble and risk than they’re 
worth.”268 
In this risk-averse spirit, Congress, in the waning days of 2010, 
effectively eliminated the President’s ability to transfer Guantanamo 
prisoners to the custody of another country or bring them to the United 
States for any purpose, including prosecution.269  This legislation, which 
expires in a year, is awash in the rhetoric of the new penology, but is 
especially noteworthy for its novel insistence that the rest of the world 
assume the same posture.  To begin with, Congress specified that no 
Department of Defense funds may be used to transfer any prisoner to 
another country unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that 
the receiving state “is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or a 
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order releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism. 
Esmail v. Obama, No. 10-5282, 2011 WL 1327701, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Apr.. 8, 2011) 
(Silberman, J., concurring).  
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19, 2010, at A21. 
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designated foreign terrorist organization,” maintains “effective control” 
over any facility in which the prisoner might be detained, and is not “facing 
a threat that is likely to substantially affect its ability to exercise control 
over the individual.”270 
But these conditions, all of which bear on whether the receiving state 
can securely imprison the monsters at Guantanamo, do not exhaust the 
requirements imposed by Congress.  Before a transfer may take place, the 
receiving state must agree “to take effective steps to ensure that the 
individual cannot take action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its 
allies in the future,” must show that it has already taken steps “to ensure 
that the individual cannot engage or re-engage in any terrorist activity,” and 
must agree “to share any information with the United States that (A) is 
related to the individual or any associates of the individual; and (B) could 
affect the security of the United States, its citizens, or its allies.”271  And 
even if all these conditions have been met, no transfer is allowed if any 
prisoner who was previously transferred to the receiving state 
“subsequently engaged in any terrorist activity.”272  In short, the receiving 
state must guarantee, in advance, that the person to be transferred will never 
pose any risk to “the security of the United States, its citizens, or its 
allies.”273  No such guarantee is possible, of course, unless the person 
remains at Guantanamo—which is precisely the purpose of the legislation.  
And even if the guarantee is made, it counts for naught if any prisoner 
previously released to the state engaged in any “terrorist activity.”274 
Congress apparently assumes no other country can be sufficiently 
punitive to satisfy the security interests of the United States.  As dangerous 
as this assumption may be, it is even more astounding that Congress should 
make the same assumption about security conditions within the United 
States.  And yet it apparently did.  In the same legislation, Congress 
prohibited the use of Defense Department funds to bring a prisoner at 
Guantanamo to the United States for any reason, including prosecution.275  
Congress also barred the use of funds to modify any mainland site for 
Guantanamo prisoners, which nixes the Obama Administration’s plan to 
reconfigure the unused prison at Thomson, Illinois.276  In addition, 
Congress demanded that the Secretary of Defense, by April 1, 2011, report 
to Congress “on the merits, costs, and risks of using any proposed facility in 
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the United States, its territories, or possessions” to house Guantanamo 
prisoners.277  The report must include, inter alia, a “discussion of any 
potential risks to any community in the vicinity of any such proposed 
facility, the measures that could be taken to mitigate such risks, and the 
likely cost to the Department of Defense of implementing such measures,” 
as well as “modifications” that may be necessary “to ensure that any 
detainee transferred from Guantanamo Bay to such facility could not come 
into contact with any other individual, including any other person detained 
at such facility, that is not approved for such contact by the Department of 
Defense.”278 
Shortly after the legislation passed, the media reported that President 
Obama was considering a new executive order that would create a periodic 
review process for the four-dozen Guantanamo prisoners who cannot be 
tried but who are thought by the Administration to be too dangerous to 
release.279  It was not clear from these reports, however, whether the 
President would claim the power to hold people based solely on predictions 
of future dangerousness—that is, whether he would create a preventive 
detention regime as I have described it—or whether detentions at 
Guantanamo would continue to be based on proof of past wrongdoing.  In 
response to these reports, the Washington Post assumed he intended a 
preventive detention regime, cheered that it was a step in the right direction, 
but asked “[w]hat about the next 48?”280  Pointing out that the United States 
now seems to be operating against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Waziristan, 
an area outside any recognized war zone, the Post wondered what would 
happen in the “likely” event that the government captures new suspects who 
cannot be tried “because of a lack of admissible evidence . . . .  Would the 
administration simply let the captives go, even though intelligence reports 
indicate that they pose a threat?”281  The prospect was literally 
inconceivable to the Post, which favors a statute that would allow such 
suspects to be detained indefinitely based on nothing more than the “threat” 
of future harm.282  It bears noting that under the current state of the law, 
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such a suspect would not have a right to challenge his detention in habeas 
unless he were a United States citizen or, if a foreign national, he were 
brought to the United States or Guantanamo.283 
On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued his much-anticipated 
executive order.284  Dodging a bullet, this order did not establish a 
preventive detention regime as I have used the term.  Instead, it directed the 
creation of a regular review process for those prisoners who the 
Administration believes may be subject to indefinite detention, including 
those who cannot be prosecuted.  Those prisoners, however, may still seek a 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.285  
Such a challenge obligates the government to establish the legal and factual 
basis for continued detention, which requires proof about the past rather 
than predictions about the future.  And notably, nothing in the order 
empowers the United States to detain people who have prevailed in habeas.  
The Order, therefore, does not alter or enlarge the existing bases upon 
which the United States may detain prisoners.  That is, it did not purport to 
allow detention based solely on predictions of future dangerousness.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
And so captures the current state of play.  Otherwise responsible 
observers call for a statute that would allow the United States to detain 
suspects captured anywhere in the world, for as long as the “War on Terror” 
may last, without regard to what they may have done in the past, and based 
on no other proof than classified “intelligence reports” that they “pose a 
 
in federal court.  Id.  In fact, however, the legislation only applies to prisoners at 
Guantanamo; nothing in the law would prevent the Administration from bringing a newly 
arrested suspect to the United States for trial.  At least, not yet.  In addition, and more 
importantly, the Post argued that preventive detention would be acceptable if it were 
authorized by statute but that in the absence of a statute it would violate the rule of law.  Id.  
To the Post, in other words, the rule of law is whatever Congress says it is.  This is a 
singularly mechanical view and would no doubt come as a surprise to students of history 
who had always imagined that, for instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts from the close of 
the eighteenth century, the Espionage and Sedition Acts enacted during the First World War, 
and the law which criminalized resistance to the internment of the Japanese during the 
Second World War had been noteworthy derogations from the rule of law. 
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threat.”  By merging the overheated rhetoric of “war” with the new 
penology’s understanding of deviance and risk, American society has set 
itself on a quest for the Holy Grail—a risk management solution to terror, a 
solution which demands nothing of us and imposes all burdens on them.  
And this, we suppose, will help us win the war. 
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